Problems of Communism

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

CHINA IN 1975
Kenneth Lieberthal
Chün-tu Hsüeh

Nordic Communism
Trond Gilberg

Book Reviews
John N. Hazard
Harry Rositzke
Alfred Erich Senn
Roland Schönfeld
Stephen R. Sacks
K. C. Yeh

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Problems of Communism

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MAY-JUNE 1975 VOL. XXIV

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Cover: Teng Hsiao-p'ing, right, whose rise in the PRC leadership was a feature of Chinese political developments in January 1975, pictured with Chiao Kuan-hua, chief PRC delegate to the United Nations, at a special session of the UN General Assembly in New York in April 1974. Photo by Wide World.

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China in 1975

EDITORS' NOTE: Early 1975 brought some major developments in the People's Republic of China. For the first time in nearly a year and a half, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee met in plenary session, and shortly thereafter the first National People's Congress since 1965 took place. This Congress approved a new State Constitution to replace that of 1954. The following two articles explore the meaning of these events and their aftermath. Mr. Lieberthal looks at the implications of what occurred for the internal political situation in China, and Mr. Hsüeh analyzes the character of the new Constitution.

The Internal Political Scene

By Kenneth Lieberthal

In January 1975, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership gathered in Peking for the first plenary session of the party Central Committee in 16 months, and a few days later the first National People's Congress (NPC) to be convened in a decade opened a five-day session in the Chinese capital.[1] These meetings signified that the leadership in Peking had achieved somewhat greater unity than had characterized Chinese politics throughout 1974, a year of tension highlighted by the campaign to criticize the late Lin Piao, once Mao Tse-tung's designated successor, and the Chinese philosopher-sage, Confucius.

Fundamental issues, however, still divide the Chinese leadership—issues centering on the strategy of economic development for the last quarter of this century, the foreign policy most likely to ensure China's security, and the composition of the governing organs themselves. Given the importance of these problems, it is not surprising that evidence of friction surfaced even during what was trumpeted as the "Congress of unity [and] . . . victory." [2]

A quiet issue, moreover, continues to lurk behind the scenes of Peking politics—the question of the intentions of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the post-Mao era and the measures the leadership should take to limit the chances of Bonapartism in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Mao has sought to maintain competition among the different civilian groups in the governing apparatus, and it appears that this tension may now be limiting the capacity of the party to act decisively to subordinate the military as a force in Chinese politics during the coming years.

Mr. Lieberthal has recently become Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (New Haven, Connecticut) after teaching for four years at Swarthmore College. He is author of the forthcoming Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1975.

[1] The Second Plenum convened on January 8-10, 1975, and the NPC met January 13-17, 1975.

[2] Designation used in the press communiqué of the NPC. See *Peking Review*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Jan. 24, 1975, p. 7.

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To place the January meetings of the CC Plenum and NPC in perspective and facilitate analysis of their import for the near-term future of Chinese politics, therefore, we must first examine the prior evolution of party-military relations in the PRC and of the major economic, foreign policy, and governmental-organization issues facing the Peking leadership.

The Background

Party-military relations have remained a thorny issue in China in recent years. The CCP's military path to power left as its legacy a greater proclivity to utilize the army in civilian political and economic tasks than has characterized any other Communist country. The actual degree of military involvement in civilian responsibilities has changed over time: it was high in the early 1950's, low in the mid-1950's, and increasing during the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Cultural Revolution of 1965-69, however, created an unprecedented situation when the military, in the wake of the destruction of the party apparatus, literally assumed administrative control over the entire society.

The Party Constitution[3] adopted by the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April 1969 designated Lin Piao, China's Minister of Defense, as Mao Tse-tung's successor at the same time that it reaffirmed the principle of party control over the army. Thus, the party rules actually reflected the major contradiction inherent in Chinese politics at the end of the Cultural Revolution. Tension over the issue of military versus civilian rule has saturated Chinese political life ever since. The leadership's subsequent efforts to redress the civilian-military balance have given increased importance to two related questions: Who should assume the power given up by the military as it withdraws from politics? And how far should the party go in taking punitive measures against those military leaders who have opposed the re-establishment of civilian rule?

Four major known events have punctuated the process of reasserting civilian control since the Ninth Congress. First, at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee in August-September 1970, Lin Piao attempted to consolidate his position and increase his future leverage over such civilian political leaders as Chou En-lai, but he immediately encountered strong opposition from Mao. Second, in August 1971 Mao toured the provinces and indicated in his talks with provincial leaders that he planned to confront Lin and force him to step down. Anticipating this, Lin planned a decisive move to reverse the situation (purportedly, an assassination attempt against Mao), but the plan failed, resulting in Lin's flight and death in a plane crash in Mongolia in early September. The whole incident touched off a purge of high-level military commanders with close ties to Lin.[4] Third, the Tenth Congress of the CCP in August 1973 formally revised the Party Constitution, omitting the designation of Lin as Mao's successor and reaffirming the primacy of the party over the military.[5] Fourth and last, in January 1974 China's eight most important regional military commanders were ordered to relinquish their posts, which in most cases they had occupied for years, and to assume command of other military regions, taking only a few personal aides with them.[6] Besides their military posts, many of these commanders had held important political positions in their former regions, but none was appointed to a similar position in his new location.

In short, the 1969-74 period witnessed an uneven and in some instances violent process aimed at re-establishing civilian control. By the eve of the January 1975 National People's Congress, progress toward this objective had been substantial, but China still remained without a Minister of Defense, a PLA Chief of Staff, or a head of the PLA General Political Department. The January meetings of the party Central Committee and the NPC thus came at a time when a further step in the consolidation of civilian power could be expected.

In the economic sphere, the critical issue facing the Chinese leadership has been the question of the best strategy for achieving maximum efficiency in the utilization of the country's scarce resources. Considerable importance also attaches to the social and political implications of any strategy adopted.

[3] Text in *Ibid.*, Vol. 12, No. 18, April 30, 1969, pp. 36-39.

[4] On these events, see Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao," *China Quarterly* (London), No. 55, July-September 1973, pp. 427-49; Michael Y. M. Kau, *The Lin Piao Affair*, New York, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975, pp. xix-lxxvii and 55-123; Edward Rice, *Mao's Way*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1974, pp. 499-513; and Harry Harding, "Political Trends in China Since the Cultural Revolution," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia), Vol. 402, July 1972, pp. 67-82.

[5] See the text of the revised Party Constitution in *Peking Review*, Vol. 16, No. 35-36, Sept. 7, 1973, pp. 26-29.

[6] Curiously, the shift involved an exchange of regional commands between four *pairs* of military commanders, a pattern whose rationale and significance remain a mystery.

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Members of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee pictured at Peking Airport in April 1974: from left, Wang Hung-wen, Vice-Chairman of the CCP CC; Yeh Chien-ying, also Vice-Chairman of the CCP CC and, since January 1975, China's Minister of Defense; Madame Chiang Ch'ing (wife of Mao Tse-tung); and Premier Chou En-lai.

—John Burns/*Toronto Globe and Mail*.

China has achieved impressive gains in both agriculture and industry, yet it remains a country with potentially severe economic problems. The most critical is the apparent slowdown in the *rate* of agricultural growth in recent years, a development that could have extremely serious implications for the future. In order to cope with this problem, the Chinese leadership in 1972 made a basic decision to effect a significant increase in imports from the West[7]—many of these imports in high technology areas having direct relevance to the expansion of agricultural production.[8] The Chinese evidently decided at about the same time to reduce defense expenditures in favor of greater investment in industry and agriculture.[9]

These recent trends suggest that economic planners in Peking have made a strong case for giving absolute priority to maximizing investment and technological development. The Chinese leaders, however, also face substantial pressures from industrial workers and others for higher living standards, as evidenced by the many strikes—some of them prolonged and bitter—that occurred during the 1974 campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius.[10] The tension between the need to accumulate funds for investment[11] and the desire to meet workers' de-

[7] The level of Chinese imports from non-Communist countries jumped from $1,805 million in 1971 to $2,300 million in 1972 and to $4,270 million in 1973. Total Chinese trade including exports as well as imports may have increased another 30 to 40 percent in dollar terms in 1974. *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Vol. 12, No. 12, December 1974, pp. 5 and 7.

[8] For a list of complete plants sold to China in 1973, see *US-China Business Review* (Washington, DC), Vol. 1, January-February 1974, pp. 36-37. For a similar list covering January-March 1974 and plant sales under negotiation at that time, see *ibid.*, Vol. 1, No. 3, May-June 1974, pp. 38-39.

[9] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1973*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 27.

[10] *The New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1974, p. 3.

[11] Levels of investment in industry since the beginning of the 1970's have been markedly higher than they were in the 1950's and 1960's. See Dwight Perkins, "China's Fourth Five-Year Plan," *US-China Business Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, March-April 1974, p. 20.

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mands for consumption is thus serious and growing. A related ideological problem involves the extent to which material incentives should be used to stimulate production.

In foreign affairs, the major policy issue is how to maximize China's national security—through continued efforts toward rapprochement with the United States and an improved relationship with Japan or via a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.[12] This question, moreover, overlaps with the issues of military/civilian relations and economic development strategy. It impinges on the former because the logic of détente is one that should force the Chinese military to accept a new and different set of threat perceptions—something that is never easy for a military establishment to do—and also because it enables civilian leaders to argue for lower defense expenditures. It impinges on the latter because, as noted above, the increased inflow of Western imports that has accompanied détente now represents an integral part of the post-1972 Chinese strategy of economic development.

The military is not the only group in China that harbors doubts about détente. Dependence on any foreign country has been a touchy issue in Chinese politics for the past 100 years, and it remains so today. In addition, the recent economic difficulties of the non-Communist West have undoubtedly decreased Peking's confidence in a strategy of relying on the strength and vitality of the United States to counter the Soviet threat in Asia.[13] More immediately, the economic malaise in the West has hurt Chinese exports and thereby diminished the PRC's ability to pay for increased imports. To offset this loss, China is rapidly developing its oil-export capacity (and is promising virtually all its oil exports to Japan in an effort to keep that country from turning increasingly toward the USSR).[14] The situation, however, remains complex and difficult, and Peking has recently agreed to financing arrangements that are very close to the type of medium-term borrowing that China eschewed during the 1960's.[15] Thus, for a range of reasons—from differing expectations concerning the future vitality and endurance of the West as a counterweight to the Soviet Union to more narrow calculations of bureaucratic interest—disagreement continues in Peking regarding the desirability of détente with the United States and Japan and continued hostility toward the USSR.[16]

And finally, there is still controversy in China over the proper composition of the civilian ruling organs. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao attacked the CCP organization for harboring career-oriented bureaucrats who had become too attached to both reformist problem-solving methods and the perquisites of office. By the end of that upheaval most of the old apparatus had been destroyed and replaced by military-dominated revolutionary committees.[17] The drive to restrict the political role of the PLA after the Ninth Congress, however, created a pressing need for civilian personnel with the requisite administrative and political skills, and the "old cadres" (*i.e.*, those who had held responsible party and government positions before the Cultural Revolution) provided an important reservoir of the necessary talent. The old cadres have consequently been rehabilitated in large numbers during the past few years, as symbolized most strikingly by the rapid resurgence of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the former head of the party Secretariat, who had been vilified during the Cultural Revolution as the "No. 2 person in authority taking the capitalist road."

The rehabilitation of old cadres nevertheless remains a highly-charged issue in Chinese politics, for it has implications not only for the legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution itself but also for the future careers of people who achieved some prominence during the turmoil of that enormous campaign, as well as for factional politics in anticipation of the succession. While the legitimacy question may be of symbolic importance, the other two aspects raise more concrete political problems of great sensitivity.

In short, the People's Republic now faces choices across a broad spectrum of issues that will profoundly affect the course of the ongoing Chinese revolution during the last quarter of this century. All consideration of these problems is, moreover, complicated by the dominant immediate concern pervading Chinese politics—namely, that in the

[12] A policy coupling militant opposition to both the US and the Soviet Union with a strengthening of China's ties to the Third World may also have some advocates in Peking, although this clearly seems to be the least likely alternative in the current policy debate.

[13] As an oil exporter, the USSR has not experienced economic difficulties comparable to those faced by the United States and Japan over the past few years.

[14] See Nicholas Ludlow, "China's Oil," *US-China Business Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, January-February 1974, pp. 21-23.

[15] See Audrey Donnithorne, "China's Foreign Trade System Changes Gear," *ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

[16] The question of a moderation of policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may not, in fact, be *openly* debated among Chinese policymakers in view of Mao Tse-tung's vociferous opposition to any compromise with Moscow.

[17] There was also a tendency for military figures to take over leading positions even in party bodies as these were reestablished.

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near future the CCP will have to undergo its first change in top-level leadership since the Long March 40 years ago. The imminence of the succession to Mao Tse-tung (*and* Chou En-lai) effectively weds policy preferences to power considerations in a way that makes it impossible to analyze the one without due consideration of the other. And the fate of Mao Tse-tung's two previous heirs apparent—Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao—highlights the reality that the stakes are high in personal as well as policy terms.

Contending Forces

There are three major groups currently vying for power in a post-Mao China. The following profiles of these groups and their policy positions are necessarily oversimplifications to a degree. In some cases, the policy preferences of individual personalities are not sufficiently well known to permit identifying them clearly with one group or another. Moreover, some high-level leaders may not "fit" precisely into any of these groups. Nevertheless, the profiles that follow are offered as rough approximations based on the best available evidence.

Chou En-lai heads what may be called the "Peking group," which also counts among its members central economic planners and many rehabilitated high-ranking officials from the pre-Cultural Revolution state bureaucracy. These men are relatively urban-centered and are willing to use any reasonable means to expand China's economy, if necessary at the short-run cost of increased social inequality. They see China's long-term security as dependent upon rapid industrialization and eventual achievement of economic independence, and to reach these goals they favor the importation of foreign goods and technology insofar as these benefit China's economic growth. While China remains weak militarily, they seek security in an active diplomacy calculated to play off one potentially threatening power against another.

The "Shanghai group" counts Yao Wen-yuan and Chiang Ch'ing among its leaders, and at the recent

Members of the CCP Politburo at Peking Airport in April 1974: from left, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, CCP First Secretary in Shanghai; Wang Tung-hsing, Director of the Central Committee's General Office; Hua Kuo-feng, CCP First Secretary in Honan Province; and Ch'en Hsi-lien, Commander of the Peking Military Region.

—John Burns/Toronto Globe and Mail.

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National People's Congress Chang Ch'un-ch'iao voiced the group's concerns. These people are fundamentalists who insist that China must not sacrifice revolutionary values on the altar of economic development. They have concentrated their efforts on cultural and educational policies as the prime vehicles for changing the way 800 million Chinese think. Reducing the spread of the "three major differences"—between workers and peasants, between town and country, and between mental and manual labor—is of great importance to them.[18] Distrust of foreign countries is another characteristic of the group, whose members fear that economic and political intercourse with other nations—especially the United States and the Soviet Union—may corrupt the revolution.

Third and last is the "military group," which includes China's major PLA commanders, the most important of whom at present is probably Ch'en Hsi-lien. These men may be reluctant to entrust China's post-Mao leadership entirely to civilian party officials. Their precise policy preferences are not altogether clear; however, most members of the group seem to edge closer to the "Peking group" so far as domestic priorities are concerned. In the sphere of foreign policy, they may share with the "Shanghai group" a mutual distaste for détente with the United States, but as men who are acutely sensitive to China's national security concerns, they almost certainly diverge from the "Shanghai group" in their preference for toning down the intensity of the PRC's conflict with the Soviet Union.

The Second Plenum and the NPC

The January 1975 meetings of the 10th CCP Central Committee's Second Plenum and the National People's Congress provided a good deal of information on the current intersection of policy perspectives and power relationships among the three contending groups just described. The communiqué issued by the Second Plenum, which met first and finalized the agenda for the Congress, announced the elevation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing to the positions of Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Chou En-lai and Chang Ch'un-ch-iao delivered major reports at the Congress, which formally approved a new State Constitution and made appointments to all top-level government positions, including the premiership, vice-premierships, and heads of all ministries and commissions of the State Council.[19]

Reassertion of civilian control over the military emerged as a major leitmotif of the January meetings and actions that flowed from them. The post of Defense Minister, vacant since the fall of Lin Piao in September 1971, was at last filled by the NPC's appointment to that position of Yeh Chien-ying, a 76-year-old Army man known to have a long association with Chou En-lai. Much more significant were two civilian appointments to top-level army positions made public immediately after the conclusion of the Congress.[20] Teng Hsiao-p'ing, on top of his elevation in the party hierarchy, became the first civilian Chief of Staff of the PLA in the history of the PRC, and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was named to the key post of head of the PLA's General Political Department. Finally, Article 15 of the new Constitution enacted by the NPC made the Chairman of the CCP commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[21]

The January developments thus clearly marked a further consolidation of civilian party control over the PLA. These decisions did not, however, add up to a complete resolution of the civilian/military problem, for any long-term solution must be one which will enable the party to bring young and dynamic military leaders into positions of power with full confidence that they will not use these positions to obstruct the party leadership. Perhaps what is most striking about the National People's Congress and related events, in this respect, is the evident lack of movement in such a direction. Cur-

[18] On this and other positions of the "Shanghai group," see, e.g., Yao Wen-yuan, "On the Social Basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique," *Hung Ch'i* (Peking), No. 3, 1975, translated in *Peking Review*, Vol. 18, No. 10, March 7, 1975, pp. 5-10.

[19] For the official English translations of the communiqué of the Second Plenum and of the documents of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress, see *Peking Review*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Jan. 24, 1975, pp. 6-25. The communiqué of the Second Plenum is on p. 6. The most important of the Congress documents appear on the following pages: Press Communiqué of the Congress, pp. 6-8; list of the Premier, Vice-Premiers, and ministers of the State Council, pp. 11-12; Constitution of the PRC, pp. 12-17; Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's "Report on the Revision of the Constitution," pp. 18-20; and Chou En-lai's "Report on the Work of the Government," pp. 21-25. All subsequent references are to these translated texts. For the Chinese texts of the first two Congress documents, see *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 19, 1975; for the Constitution and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's report, *ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1975; and for Chou En-lai's report, *ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1975.

[20] *The New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1975, pp. 1 and 4.

[21] Overall command of the armed forces has previously been vested in the Chairman of the Republic, the post last held by Liu Shao-ch'i but now omitted from the Constitution.

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rently, a 76-year-old military leader and two party men, the youngest of whom is in his sixties, head China's central military establishment. This leadership dilemma signifies the party's continuing inability to remove the military question from the agenda of Chinese politics.

On questions of economic strategy, the NPC seemed to mark the victory of Chou En-lai's approach and priorities. Chou used his "Report on the Work of the Government" as a platform to announce a basic plan of economic development for the remainder of the century. His plan allows for another five years of putting things in order, to be followed by 20 years of rapid economic growth.[22] Several articles of the new Constitution reconfirmed the priority given to pragmatic economic policies by guaranteeing the continued existence of private plots (Article 7), side-line production (Articles 5 and 7), and the system of remuneration according to type and quantity of work done (Article 9).

The NPC also confirmed Chou's placement of a number of longtime associates, all with impressive pre-Cultural Revolution government careers, in key administrative slots under the State Council. Of the 29 ministerial appointees announced at the NPC, 18 were individuals with substantial pre-Cultural Revolution experience in Chou's State Council, while another seven were men who had spent most of their post-1949 careers in the military.[23] Five of the latter were placed in ministries in charge of military-related heavy industry, repeating a pattern that already existed prior to the Cultural Revolution. The remaining ministerial posts were filled with an assortment of former provincial party secretaries and others (including a champion ping-pong player, who was named head of the Physical Culture and Sports Commission).[24] The twelve appointments to the more important rank of vice-premier reflected a somewhat greater attempt to balance competing political interests, but they, too, were striking primarily for the number and prominence of former close associates of Premier Chou included among them.

The reports made to the Congress by Chou and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao provided ample evidence of the conflicting viewpoints of the Peking and Shanghai groups. In the sphere of domestic policy, Chou stressed the need to give priority to rapid economic growth and quoted Mao Tse-tung to the effect that China should "learn from the good experiences of other countries," adding that "we must always adhere to this line." [25] He also ticked off a number of accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, concluding with the optimistic observation that "the emergence of all these new things *has strengthened* the all-around dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie in the realm of the superstructure. . . ." [26] Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, by contrast, subtly raised the issue of the non-economic costs of the pragmatic policies advocated by Chou, and he also seemed to challenge Chou's implication that the dictatorship of the proletariat in China was now secure. Reaching into the Maoist lexicon for a quotation on the continuing importance of class struggle, he warned that *"the bourgeoisie will seize hold of many fronts if the proletariat does not occupy them."* [27] Chou thus implied that the social and political costs of his strategy of economic development need not be high, whereas Chang voiced concern over the abuses to which that strategy might lead.

In the sphere of foreign policy, the clash of views was more muted, though still apparent. For his part, Chou reaffirmed the policy of détente with the United States, albeit cautioning the US on the need to continue implementation of the provisions of the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972. He also reaffirmed China's policy of maintaining good relations with Japan.[28] Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, on the other hand, did not speak to foreign policy in any detail in his report on the revision of the Constitution, although the Preamble to that document provided him with an excuse to address this issue if he had chosen to do so. Chang did hint, however, that he disagreed with the thrust of Chou's remarks in that realm[29]—an indication that foreign policy issues may well have been the subject of undisclosed contention during the January meetings.

On the issue of the make-up of the governmental apparatus, Chou's and Chang's reports gave clear evidence of continuing tension over the relative roles

[22] Chou's "Report," *loc. cit.*, p. 23.

[23] Wang Cheng, who was appointed head of the Fourth Ministry of Machine Building, has had substantial experience in both the military and governmental bureaucracies and consequently is doublecounted in these figures.

[24] The author is grateful to Steven Butts of Columbia University for providing background information on these newly-appointed ministers.

[25] Chou's "Report," *loc. cit.*, p. 24.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22. Emphasis added.

[27] Chang's "Report," *loc. cit.*, p. 20. Emphasis added.

[28] Chou's "Report," *loc. cit.*, p. 24.

[29] Chang asserted that "only by emancipating all mankind can the proletariat achieve its own final emancipation." See Chang's "Report," *loc. cit.*, p. 20.

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Chairman Mao welcomes Dominic Mintoff, Prime Minister of Malta, in January 1975.

—Camera Press.

of former cadres and of those who rose to influential positions during the Cultural Revolution. Article 22 of the new State Constitution confirmed the revolutionary committees as the permanent basic organs of the government structure. Chou, however, referred to these committees as "composed of the old, middle-aged, and young," whereas Chang alluded to them as "formed on the basis of the revolutionary three-in-one combination." [30] Chang's formula, developed during the Cultural Revolution, required that the revolutionary committees be made up of three elements: old cadres, military personnel, and representatives of the revolutionary masses. This makes mandatory the inclusion of nonbureaucratic personnel, whereas Chou's formulation allows their exclusion.[31]

The preceding analysis suggests that the Congress of "unity and victory" in fact embodied the type of underlying dialectical tension that Mao Tse-tung has in the past tried to maintain in Chinese politics. Did the January meetings in Peking, then, actually reflect Mao's preferences? If Mao did approve, how can one explain recent articles in the Chinese press attacking the results of the meetings? And if not, how could meetings of such importance be convened and take actions contrary to the Chairman's will? And finally, what are the implications of these events for the succession?

The Question of Mao's Position

There is impressive evidence that Mao sought to dissociate himself from the decisions taken in Peking in January. The Chairman's only two public appearances between November 1974 and the present time of writing (April 1975) took place away from Peking just at the time of the January meetings: he met Prime Minister Dominic Mintoff of Malta on January 9, when the Second Plenum of the Central Committee was in its second day, and he talked with Franz-Josef Strauss, head of West Germany's Christian Social Union party, on January 16, just at the mid-point of the NPC session. Both of Mao's meetings with the foreign visitors took place in Central China, and both received wide publicity in the Chinese media.[32] They signaled to all concerned that Mao was avoiding the Plenum and NPC sessions by choice and not because of ill health. Moreover, none of the documents that emanated from the two sessions gave any explicit indication that Chairman Mao endorsed the proceedings or their results. Finally, Wang Tung-hsing, a full member of the party Politburo and a close associate of Mao's, also was conspicuously absent from both the Plenum and the NPC meeting, although the fact that he was listed among those who presented a wreath at the memorial service for Li Fu-ch'un on January 15 [33] indicated that he had not been purged.

Further evidence tending to corroborate Mao's dissatisfaction has surfaced in the Chinese press since the January Congress, taking the form of prominently featured articles tantamount to only thinly-veiled attacks on many of the decisions taken there. The articles have focused primarily on the related questions of economic development strategy and foreign policy.

One of these articles—authored by Yao Wen-yuan, a leading spokesman of the Shanghai group,

[30] Chou's "Report," *loc. cit.*, p. 21; Chang's "Report," *loc. cit.*, p. 19. The author thanks James Reardon-Anderson for calling his attention to this point. Chang's formula is the more radical one used during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution, while Chou's is the more conservative one employed in the latter part of the Cultural Revolution when an effort was made to reduce the role of the revolutionary masses.

[31] Chang's formula is one that is likely to appeal to members of the "military group."

[32] For the announcements of these meetings, see *Peking Review*, Vol. 18, Nos. 3 and 4, Jan. 17 and Jan. 24, 1975.

[33] See *ibid.*, Vol. 18, No. 5, Jan. 31, 1975, p. 6.

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and published in *Hung Ch'i,* the theoretical organ of the party Central Committee[34]—appeared in connection with a new nationwide campaign, launched soon after the January Congress, to "study the dictatorship of the proletariat" and restrict "bourgeois rights." [35] In a critique patently aimed at the NPC's endorsement of Chou's economic development strategy, Yao argued that the continued existence of substantial inequalities based on material incentives could over time corrupt the revolution by encouraging cadres to maintain the *status quo* rather than try to reduce the "three major differences" between workers and peasants, town and country, and mental and manual labor. He warned:

If we . . . call . . . for the consolidation, extension, and strengthening of bourgeois rights and that part of inequality it entails, the inevitable result will be polarization . . .and there will be a change in the nature of the system of ownership in certain departments and units which follow the revisionist line; . . . instances of oppression and exploitation of the laboring people will once again occur.

Yao, however, merely called for more study of the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to prevent this sort of deterioration—a rather mild remedy considering his view of the gravity of the problem.[36]

While Yao and others have concentrated their fire on the potentially harmful effects of the economic strategy advocated by Chou and codified to a degree in Articles 5, 7, and 9 of the new State Constitution, the related policy of détente with the United States has also undergone scathing criticism. For example, an article from the "Mass Criticism Group of the Military and Political College" asserted that "seeking peace through compromise and concession can only inflate the enemy's reactionary arrogance" and flatly declared that those who advocate such policies are mouthing "out-and-out words of national betrayal and surrender." [37] Quite obviously, the January meetings had not ended debate on the central foreign policy issue confronting the PRC.

Implications for the Future

The evidence presented above seems clearly to support the hypothesis that the January meetings of the Second Plenum and NPC and the decisions that flowed from them did not enjoy Mao's positive approval. If this was in fact the case, it suggests at a minimum that the party Chairman is no longer in control of events in Peking. Does the decision-

Yao Wen-yuan, a leading spokesman for the Shanghai group.

—John Burns/Toronto Globe and Mail.

[34] Yao Wen-yuan, *loc. cit.,* (fn. 18).

[35] For references to this movement in various Chinese provinces, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), Feb. 24, 1975, Section K; Feb. 25, 1975, Section H; Feb. 26, 1975, Section L; Feb. 28, 1975, Section J; and March 4, 1975, Section G.

[36] There is evidence that this new campaign is already becoming all things to all people, as occurred with the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. In what was apparently intended to set forth the theoretical bases of the campaign, *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Feb. 22, 1975) carried a three-page section of quotations from Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat and the problem of bourgeois rights, reprinted in *Peking Review,* Vol. 18, No. 9, Feb. 28, 1975, pp. 5-12. However, the "message" of these quotations changed from group to group, stressing at different times (1) the importance of firm party dictatorship in order to restrict bourgeois rights; (2) the necessarily prolonged existence of bourgeois rights and the consequent importance of dealing with the problem patiently and gradually; and (3) the need to struggle against bourgeois rights due to the magnitude of the danger they entail. A military viewpoint was voiced by the "commanders and fighters of an anti-chemical warfare unit stationed in Chekiang," who stressed that "the People's Liberation Army . . . has great responsibility in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat" (see *ibid.,* Vol. 18, No. 6, Feb. 7, 1975, p. 7).

[37] *Ibid.,* Vol. 18, No. 8, Feb. 21, 1975, p. 7.

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making process, then, now resemble the "two headquarters" model of the period 1965 through early 1966? The answer is probably not that simple.

In an autumn 1974 talk with cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mao purportedly complained of being overwhelmed with questions of detail, indicating that he would further restrict his activities and deal only with major issues of principle; and Chou, who was also present, reportedly interjected that he, too, would pull back from detailed administrative work.[38] These remarks were consistent both with Mao's prolonged stay in Central China and with Chou's even longer sojourn in a Peking hospital. In recent months, Teng Hsiao-p'ing has clearly assumed the type of day-to-day responsibilities that Chou formerly shouldered.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, First Deputy Premier of the PRC and (since last January) Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, reviews an honor guard at Orly Airport in May 1975. Accompanying Mr. Teng is French Premier Jacques Chirac and, to the rear, General Jean Favreau, Military Governor of Paris.

—Keystone.

The fact that Chou has now largely removed himself from everyday policymaking in favor of dealing with more fundamental issues means that the Premier may now have assumed a role more nearly akin, *de facto,* to that which Mao has traditionally occupied. Although the major outlines of most of Chou's policies as enunciated at the NPC undoubtedly enjoy Mao's backing, the Chairman probably remains more concerned than Premier Chou about their possible social and political consequences. With both men anticipating their succession,[39] moreover, each may be trying in subtle ways to nudge Chinese politics in the direction he believes desirable. Mao may, therefore, be encouraging the Shanghai group to voice its concerns over the policies of the Peking group.

Viewed in this perspective, the January meetings and the Shanghai group's response through the media may well demonstrate the types of leverage that the contending forces can exercise in the current Chinese political milieu. The Peking group under Chou has now secured a firm grip on the party and government apparatus, except for the organs concerned with culture.[40] The Shanghai group retains access to the Chinese media and—with Mao Tse-tung's backing—can stir up political campaigns that run counter to the policy interests of the Peking group.

What of the third major group—the military? It is readily understandable that under the present political circumstances neither the Shanghai nor the Peking group seems willing to act decisively to remove the military from politics, for fear of driving

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[38] *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), February 1975, p. 92.

[39] In light of the January developments, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao appear to have emerged as the front-running contenders for the succession, with Teng occupying a superior position in all three of China's official hierarchies. It is tempting—but probably inaccurate—to view Teng as Chou's "nominee" for the succession and Chang as Mao's favorite. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, Chang and Chou did voice conflicting views on basic policy problems at the NPC, and it seems likely that Teng represents Chou's preferred choice, while Mao may be insisting that Teng *and* Chang share power so as to achieve the mix of policies the Chairman desires.

[40] Given the importance of cultural policy from the viewpoint of the Shanghai group, it is striking that the NPC virtually ignored this entire sphere. The omission may indicate that the "Shanghai group" will continue to control policy in the cultural area, although the ministerial appointments announced by the NPC in January were somewhat equivocal in this regard. Yü Hui-yung, who seems to lean toward the "Shanghai group," was named to the post of Minister of Culture, but at the same time Chou Jung-hsin, a close associate of Chou En-lai, was given the Education Ministry, which remains critically important for training the specialists required to realize Chou's economic plans.

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the PLA into the arms of its opponents in a succession struggle that can start at any moment. This common feeling among the leaders of both civilian groups that each may in the future need military support seems likely to guarantee that the PLA will remain a major potential force in Chinese politics.

Finally, during the succession, all these complex considerations of factional power will most probably make it still more difficult to resolve the substantive disagreements that continue to exist beneath the surface of Chinese politics over how best to deal with the pressing problems that the PRC faces in the realms of economic development, foreign policy, and the composition of the organs of leadership.

The New Constitution

By Chün-tu Hsüeh

The new Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) adopted by the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) on January 17, 1975,[1] is reflective of the vast transformations that occurred in China's politics, economy, and culture over the intervening 20-odd years since the adoption of the Constitution of 1954. The new document mirrors important changes in the socioeconomic bases of the Chinese political superstructure as well as ongoing conflicts over basic policy issues within the nation's leadership. While "legitimizing" various institutional innovations and "new things" created during the Cultural Revolution, the new Constitution formally reestablishes many of the political and administrative structures that were shattered by that upheaval, and it explicitly affirms the principle of centralized and direct party rule over the government and the armed forces. Finally, looked at in conjunction with various important political and military appointments shortly before and after the convocation of the NPC, it provides some clues to the framework for Chairman Mao Tse-tung's succession. The present article attempts to analyze the new Constitution with a view to determining what insights it affords into the political process in China and institutional perspectives affecting the resolution of policy conflicts in the PRC today.

Western observers sometimes tend to dismiss the constitutions of Communist states as meaningless because of the discrepancies between what the late scholar of Soviet affairs, Merle Fainsod, called "constitutional myth and political realities."[2] While it is true that some constitutional provisions under Communist rule have often been ignored or violated, the same may also be said of politics in non-Communist states. It is, in fact, too simplistic to consider the Communist constitutions as mere camouflage for oppressive rule. The new Chinese Constitution performs some functions which are common to constitutions everywhere. It legalizes the existing social order and makes explicit its ideological principles; it establishes a framework of government and administration; it regulates social and institutional behavior; and it enumerates Chinese goals and aspirations. It is "confirmatory" as well as "programmatic," and "normative" rather

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[1] For the official English text of the Constitution, see *Peking Review* (Peking), Jan. 24, 1975, pp. 12-17. The Chinese text and other related NPC documents may be found in *Hung Ch'i* (Peking), No. 2, 1975, pp. 5-41.

[2] Chapter 11 of Fainsod's *How Russia Is Ruled*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963, bears this title.

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The rostrum at the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, held in the Great Hall of the People, Peking, from January 13 to 17, 1975.

—Keystone.

than "nominal" or "semantic."[3] It is also a "flexible" constitution in the sense that it requires no special procedure for its amendment. Finally, though similar to the "parliamentary-executive" type of constitution, it rejects the concept of separation of powers.

There are marked differences between the new Chinese Constitution and the old. In part, these stem from the different circumstances under which the two were adopted. In the period from the establishment of Communist rule in October 1949 until enactment of the PRC's first Constitution in 1954, two documents served as a sort of provisional constitution—the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. In those years, the Peking leaders consolidated their power, carried out land reform, and moved to rehabilitate the national economy, thereby preparing the necessary preconditions for establishing a planned economy and beginning the gradual transition to a socialist society. The 1954 Constitution set down in legal form the central tasks of the country in that period of transition, and the nationwide preparation and discussion which led up to its adoption by the First NPC were earnestly reported.[4]

[3] "Confirmatory" because it legitimizes existing political arrangements, and "programmatic" because it sets forth certain aims for the future. A "nominal" or "semantic" constitution would be one which merely expresses "a far-from-realized ideal or seeks to camouflage the actual situation" rather than fixing norms based on realities. For a discussion of the classification of constitutions, see Leslie Wolf-Phillips, Ed., *Constitutions of Modern States: Selected Texts and Commentary*, New York, Praeger, 1968, Introduction.

[4] For the background of and discussions on the 1954 Constitution, see Arthur Steiner, "Constitutionalism in Communist China," *The American Political Science Review* (Washington, DC), March 1955, pp. 1-21, and Franklin W. Houn, "Communist China's New Constitution," *The Western Political Quarterly* (Salt Lake City, Utah), June 1955, pp. 199-233.

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In contrast, the Fourth NPC was held in secret and against the background of a turbulent decade marked by the Cultural Revolution and a growing leadership crisis. The 1954 Constitution had long been inoperative, and the task of restoring party rule and governmental stability required the reestablishment of "a set of general rules."[5] The last National People's Congress had met in December 1964-January 1965, and convocation of its successor was repeatedly postponed as a result of continuing intra-party struggles in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. One can only surmise that the work of revising the constitution was also affected by these circumstances. It is likewise unclear to what extent and how the masses took part in the preparatory and drafting work, which began in 1970. All we are told is that in the course of preparing for the convocation of the Fourth National People's Congress, a total of 2,885 deputies were elected "after extensive democratic consultations and repeated discussions." [6]

There are some other general contrasts that are worth noting before going on to a detailed examination of changes in different subject areas. One is that whereas the 1954 Constitution was modeled on Soviet-style socialist legality and looked to Marxism-Leninism for its theoretical guidance, the new Constitution draws its inspiration not only from Marxism-Leninism but also from the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Another is that the new Constitution is considerably shorter than the previous document, consisting of 30 articles as compared to 106, with most of the reduction in the sections dealing with the structure of the state. The simplicity of the new document may be explained by the desire of Mao and other leaders to minimize constitutional restraints and preserve flexibility in the governing process. In this regard, it marks a sharp departure not only from the legalistic approach of the 1954 Constitution, but also from the constitutions of the other socialist states.[7]

Role of the Party

According to the Constitution adopted by the First NPC in September 1954, China was a people's democratic state led by the working class and based on an alliance of workers and peasants, to be governed—in the words of the Preamble—by "a broad people's democratic united front led by the Communist Party of China.[8] After two decades, the task of socializing production relationships as prescribed in the Constitution of 1954 had, in the main, been completed. Therefore, the new Constitution speaks of China as "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants." Thus, an end to the stage of "people's democracy" —sometimes called "new democracy," or "people's democratic dictatorship"—has been formally acknowledged long after its actual disappearance. Although the minor political parties that joined hands with the CCP in 1949 only to lose any real significance as the Communists consolidated their power apparently continue to exist, the "people's democratic united front" in which they participated has now been replaced by a "revolutionary united front" (Preamble) which, according to Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, includes the "patriotic democratic parties and patriotic personages in all walks of life." [9] The Constitution stipulates (Article 16) that, when necessary, "a certain number of patriotic personages may be specially invited to take part" as NPC deputies. The

[5] Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, in his "Report on the Revision of the Constitution" delivered at the NPC on January 13, 1975, quoted Mao in these words: "An organization must have rules, and a state also must have rules; the Constitution is a set of general rules and is a fundamental charter." *Peking Review*, Jan. 24, 1975, p. 7.

[6] "Press Communiqué of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress," *ibid.* Of the total 2,864 deputies who actually attended, some 72 percent were workers, peasants, and soldiers; 22 percent were women. There were deputies from 54 minority nationalities. Unlike under previous arrangements, however, there were no seats reserved for Taiwan, although there were 12 Taiwanese deputies.

[7] See John N. Hazard, "Chinese Constitutionalism in a New Form," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), January 1971, pp. 107-16, and Jan F. Triska, Ed., *Constitutions of the Communist Party States*, Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1968. Although Hazard's comments referred to the "Draft of the Revised Constitution" reportedly adopted by the second plenary session of the CCP Ninth Central Committee of August 23-September 6, 1970, most of his comparisons of the new Chinese constitutional approach and that of other socialist states remain valid.

The official communiqués of January 1975 made no mention of the existence of the 1970 Draft, which had been widely circulated outside of China. For an English translation of the latter, see *ibid.*, pp. 100-06. It should be mentioned that the 1970 Draft comprising a Preamble and 30 articles was revised by the First Plenary Session of the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973. The 1973 Draft consisted of 30 articles and omitted both the Preamble and mention of Lin Piao, although it retained some references to Mao Tse-tung which were eventually deleted from the 1975 Constitution. For a comparison of various "drafts" and the 1975 Constitution, see *Chung hua Yueh-pao* (Hong Kong), No. 711, December 1974, pp. 31-37, and William Hsu's article in *ibid.*, No. 713, February 1975, pp. 44-47.

[8] For the official English-language text of the 1954 PRC Constitution, see *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1961.

[9] Chang, "Report . . . ," *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

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formulation suggests that the target of the united front may have shifted away from China proper—particularly to those overseas Chinese and Chinese in Taiwan who might be drawn, regardless of class origin, into a front aimed at resolving the "Taiwan problem."

In most Communist states, the leading role of the Communist party is given constitutional recognition but is usually exercised through extra-constitutional forms. By contrast, the new Chinese Constitution not only reestablishes the party rule which had been virtually displaced by the revolutionary committees set up during the Cultural Revolution, but also goes beyond earlier constitutional legislation in specifying with unmistakable clarity and candor that ultimate power resides in the party as "the core leadership of the whole Chinese people." The Constitution further stipulates (Article 2) that the "working class exercises leadership over the state through its vanguard, the Communist Party of China." While the NPC remains the "highest organ of state power," it is explicitly placed "under the leadership of the Communist Party of China" (Article 16). Furthermore, the NPC can appoint and remove the Premier and members of the State Council only "on the proposal of the Central Committee" of the party (Article 17). Under the 1954 Constitution, the power to appoint and remove the Premier had been vested in the PRC Chairman, or chief of state, who was himself appointed by the NPC; the new Constitution in effect eliminates this office by making no provision for it.

The elimination of the PRC chairmanship is not entirely surprising in light of the political infighting that has surrounded that office in recent years. It has been widely reported that after the ouster of Liu Shao-ch'i, who had replaced Mao as PRC Chairman in 1959,[10] Mao wanted to abolish the position completely, and that one of the reasons for the fall of Lin Piao was his eagerness to maintain and take over the chairmanship against Mao's wishes.[11] With the promulgation of the new Constitution, Mao has apparently had his way. The former functions and powers of the Chairman of the PRC have now been parceled out to several organs. The Standing Committee of the NPC has been empowered to dispatch and recall plenipotentiary diplomatic representatives abroad and to receive foreign envoys. More significantly, command of the armed forces has passed explicitly to the Chairman of the Communist Party (Article 17), thereby giving legal sanction to the longstanding principle that the "party commands the gun."

[10] Liu's formal removal from the PRC Chairmanship was effected not by the NPC as constitutionally required but by the Enlarged 12th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP in October 1968, which expelled him from the party and also dismissed him from all posts both inside and outside the party. See "Communiqué of the Enlarged 12th Plenary Session of China" (October 31, 1968), in *Peking Review*, No. 44, Supplement, Nov. 1, 1968, p. vi.

[11] The earliest authoritative source on this point was Premier Chou En-lai's talk with a group of Chinese Americans in Peking on July 15, 1972, as subsequently revealed to this writer by some of those visitors.

Production Relations

In attempting to adapt the new Constitution to changes in China since 1954, its drafters had to accommodate numerous developments in the realm of economic relationships. The 1954 Constitution had listed four categories of ownership of the means of production in China: state, cooperative, individual, and capitalist. In the countryside, peasants had the constitutional right "to own land and other means of production." Four years later, in 1958, however, peasants lost this right in fact as a result of the adoption of the commune system, and by 1960 private ownership of industry and commerce had likewise ceased to exist for all practical purposes. Since then there have actually been two principal kinds of ownership in China—state and collective ownership. These are now legally specified in the new Constitution as "socialist ownership by the whole people and socialist collective ownership by the working people."

In the rural people's communes, collective ownership takes the form of "threefold ownership . . ., that is, ownership by the commune, [by] the production brigade, and [by] the production team, with the last as the basic accounting unit" (Article 7). The revised commune system is reaffirmed as "an organization which integrates government and administration and economic management." (There is, however, no provision for *urban* communes in the new Constitution.)

Despite this simple delineation of rural production relations, the new Constitution still recognizes a limited right of peasants to hold small private plots. This "institution" is highly controversial among China's leaders and came under attack during the Cultural Revolution, when some plots were reportedly confiscated. At the end of 1967, propaganda teams were dispatched to rural areas to organize "Thought

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of Mao Tse-tung study groups" in which peasants were mobilized "to fight self and repudiate revisionism." Among the targets of this campaign was the so-called policy of "three extensions and one guarantee," which in addition to decentralizing and localizing agricultural decision-making included a concession to individual incentives in the form of permitting peasants to market privately the products and livestock raised on individual plots. Despite the propaganda attacks, the agrarian policy guidelines adopted by the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in 1962 apparently remained unchanged through the turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution, and the private plots have now been guaranteed by the new Constitution. "Provided that the development and absolute predominance of the collective economy of the people's commune are ensured," states Article 7, "people's commune members may farm small plots for their personal needs, engage in limited household sideline production, and in pastoral areas keep a small number of livestock for their personal needs." Inclusion of this provision—implicitly recognizing the role of personal material incentives in increasing production—in the Constitution itself may help safeguard Peking's more "pragmatic" leaders from possible later charges of "taking the capitalist road." However, debate among various Peking leaders over this controversial issue is hardly likely to be resolved by a constitutional provision.

Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, who delivered the report at the National People's Congress on revision of the PRC Constitution.

—John Burns/Toronto Globe and Mail.

State Structure

In redefining the structure of the state after a tumultuous decade, the new Constitution has reaffirmed much of the previous state structure, although it did abolish several institutions, including the PRC Chairmanship, the National Defense Council, and the Supreme State Conference. The general thrust of the document seems aimed at improving administrative efficiency and at strengthening direct control over the government by the party as the supreme organ of proletarian dictatorship.

As in the 1954 Constitution, it is stated that the people exercise power through people's congresses elected at all levels. The NPC remains the highest organ of state power, but, as pointed out earlier, it is now explicitly placed under the leadership of the party. The NPC's regular term of office has been increased from four years under the old Constitution to five years under the new, and it may be extended under special circumstances. The NPC is to hold one session each year, but the session may be advanced or postponed when necessary. Such provisions afford the leadership considerable flexibility in dealing with the NPC and would have eliminated the constitutional awkwardness involved in failing to convene the third NPC for a whole decade after January 1965.

Of course, the NPC—like the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—is too large and meets too infrequently to be an effective deliberative body or to exercise any real power. Consequently, as before, the Constitution instructs the NPC to elect a Standing Committee as its permanent acting body to exercise certain of its functions and powers when the NPC itself is not in session. The Standing Committee is roughly analogous to the Presidium of the USSR

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Supreme Soviet, although the Chairman of the Chinese body is not, as in the Soviet case, designated chief of state.

Under the new Constitution, the chief administrator of the People's Republic remains the Premier, or head of the State Council, although his powers have been somewhat diminished. As noted above, appointments and removals of members of the State Council are now "on the proposal" of the party Central Committee, whereas previously the NPC was authorized to appoint or dismiss members of the State Council upon the recommendation of the Premier. Thus, the Premier has lost the legal power to appoint and remove the vice-premiers, ministers, and ministers heading commissions.

The passage of time and the disappearance of the post of PRC Chairman have resulted in the abolition of two other institutions: the National Defense Council and the Supreme State Conference. The former, which had originally included a number of Kuomintang generals who went over to the Communists in 1949, was primarily a consultative body organized along united-front lines, and with the passing of these generals, its utility expired. The Supreme State Conference had comprised the PRC Chairman and Vice-Chairman, the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, the Premier, and "other persons concerned" and had been potentially an important policy-planning and decision-making organ of the state. (Mao Tse-tung's famous 1957 talk "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," for example, was delivered before the SSC.) Its abolition seems to have been dictated by the elimination of the post of PRC Chairman under the new Constitution.

At the local level, the Constitution has legitimized

Scene at the formation of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee in April 1967, during the Cultural Revolution. Seated on the rostrum are: from left, Chou En-lai, Chiang Ch'ing, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Li, Yang Ch'eng-wu, Yao Wen-yuan, Chi Pen-yu, and Kuan Feng.

—China Photo Service via Photoreporters.

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the revolutionary committees—a product of the Cultural Revolution—as "permanent organs of the local people's congresses and at the same time the local people's government." During and after the Cultural Revolution, these committees were formed throughout China to take the place of the local people's councils (elected by the people's congresses). Now, the procedures for their formation, as well as their duties, have been formally prescribed. According to Article 22 of the new Constitution, the chairman, vice-chairman, and other members of the revolutionary committees are elected and subject to recall by the people's congress at the corresponding level. The local revolutionary committees are also responsible and accountable to the organ of the state at the next higher level.

The 1975 Constitution embodies one other important change in the institutions of the PRC; it provides that the functions and powers of the procuratorial organs are henceforth to be exercised by the organs of public security at various levels. On the one hand, absorption into the public security agencies of the functions of supervision of both public agencies and private citizens that had formerly belonged to the procuracy may represent a move in the direction of "simpler administration" advocated by Chairman Mao. On the other hand, abolition of the procuracy as an independent agency may represent a reduction of procedural restraints on the operation of public security agencies and hence a potential tightening of governmental control at the expense of individual rights.

Individual Rights

The new Constitution also contains a number of direct additions to and omissions from the individual rights accorded the populace by its predecessor. On balance, it would appear that the rights of the individual are likely to be diminished by the changes, although only time and actual implementation of the new document will tell.

So far as the additions are concerned, one gets the impression that they are more reflective of the wishes of radical elements in the leadership than of any real expansion of the prerogatives of the individual. For example, "freedom to strike" has been included in Article 29—according to Chang Ch'un-chiao's report, "in accordance with Chairman Mao's proposal." [12] While this might be interpreted as an expansion of individual rights, it can also be viewed as sanctioning the future use of strikes by the radical elements which emerged during the Cultural Revolution. Their power base has been in Shanghai, one of the most important industrial cities of the country. Strikes there and in other major industrial centers might paralyze the nation and topple the government in the event of a succession power struggle. Moreover, there is another provision in the new Constitution which the radicals might utilize to their advantage. This is Article 15, which includes the people's militia with the PLA in the "workers' and peasants' own armed forces" led by the party. The people's militia, especially those elements composed of urban workers, could be strengthened as a major military force of the masses under the control of the Cultural Revolution faction.

In addition to reaffirming from the 1954 Constitution such generally recognized rights as freedom of speech, correspondence, and the press, of assembly, association, procession, and demonstration, and of religious belief, the new Constitution has added the freedom of propagation of atheism. More important, it notes among its general principles that "speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters are new forms of carrying on socialist revolution created by the masses of the people" (Article 13). Thus, distinctive elements of political activism which surfaced during the Cultural Revolution period have been given constitutional sanction.

The Cultural Revolution experience is also reflected in the omission of certain rights from the new Constitution. The right to engage in literary and artistic creation and other cultural activities and the citizens' freedom of residence or to change residence, both included in the 1954 Constitution, have now been eliminated. The first omission is clearly rooted in the Cultural Revolution, which consciously set out to shape a new culture and to remold the country's intellectuals and hence was intolerant of spontaneous and nonconformist creativity. The second draws its inspiration from the Cultural Revolution's emphasis on policies designed to eliminate differences between town and country and between mental and manual labor and to reduce urban unemployment. Under those policies, nearly ten million school graduates have been sent to mountainous and rural areas to engage in farm work since the Cultural Revolution.[13] While the majority

[12] Chang, "Report . . . ," *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

[13] Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government" (January 13, 1975), in *Peking Review*, Jan. 24, 1975, p. 21.

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

A crowd scans a large-character poster mounted on the walls of the Peking Revolutionary Committee in June 1974. The poster denounces "the oppression" indiscriminately visited on the "Left" by high-ranking "right-wing" authorities.

—AFP via Pictorial.

may have resigned themselves to "learning from the peasants," many displaced and disenchanted youths have drifted back to the cities. This has created a growing problem of law and order for the city authorities because many of these youths have no support from their families and no legal way to support themselves, and are not even entitled to food rationing cards. By eliminating the right to change residence, the new Constitution lends support to government efforts to control this disruptive urban problem.

China and the World

The new Constitution also reflects fundamental changes in China's foreign relations since the 1950's. Instead of the pledge of "indestructible friendship with the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Democracies" proclaimed in the 1954 Constitution, the new document stresses China's opposition to both "imperialist and social-imperialist policies of aggression and war"—"social-imperialist" being the term used by Peking to denounce the current policies of the Soviet Union. In his "Report on the Work of the Government" at the Fourth NPC, Chou En-lai foresaw a long continuation of ideological debate with Moscow "on matters of principle," although he did not see it as precluding "normal state relations" between the two countries. At the same time, he noted that relations between China and the United States, despite "existing fundamental differences," should continue to improve as long as the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué, agreed upon at the conclusion of President Nixon's February 1972 visit to China, are observed.[14]

The new Constitution specifically condemns the "hegemonism" of both superpowers and announces to the world that "China will never be a superpower." In a similar sort of appeal to audiences in both the Third and Second Worlds, the Preamble reaffirms Peking's commitment to "peaceful coexistence" and to an international united-front strategy. The Constitution further grants (in Article 29) the right of residence to "any foreign national persecuted for supporting a just cause, for taking part in revolutionary movements, or for engaging in scientific activities." Substitution of the wording "revolutionary movements" for the phrase "peace movements" in the comparable article of the 1954 Constitution seems to reflect the imprint of the militant revolutionary spirit of the Cultural Revolution.

The Constitution and China's Future

Having examined a number of aspects of the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China, we find ourselves still faced with a number of major unanswered questions about the future of this vast land. Whether or not there exists a foundation for political and social stability or successful economic development obviously cannot be determined solely within the framework of an analysis of the formal, legalistic articles of the PRC's Constitution. China, after all, has traditionally been ruled by men rather than laws, and its future will depend, above all, on the nature and quality of the leadership which succeeds Mao and Chou. Will it be centralized or decentralized, individual or collective, democratic

[14] For a discussion of the Shanghai Communiqué, see Chün-tu Hsüeh, "The Shangai Communiqué: Its Significance and Interpretation," *Asia Quarterly* (Brussels), No. 4, 1973, pp. 279-85.

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or authoritarian, cohesive or divided, rational or irrational, and above all, talented or mediocre? The new PRC Constitution tells us little about such matters. Indeed, as the State Constitution, it does not even touch upon the institutional framework for the succession to Mao as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. The framework for this is provided—and only in skeletal fashion—in the Party Constitution, which merely calls for election of the Chairman by a plenary session of the CCP Central Committee.[15]

As to the question of whether, after Mao, the PRC will experience rule by a single person or a collective leadership, constitutional provisions are again of little help. Throughout China's long recorded history, institutions and society worked most effectively when there was a strong and capable personal ruler. China has rarely experienced collective rule. Yet, we must be reminded that the prestige and legitimacy of a personal ruler cannot be cultivated overnight. As long as the question of leadership remains unresolved, other important questions of laws and institutions will doubtless remain unanswered.

Moreover, in periods of revolutionary change and experiment, institutions often become inoperative. The PRC has been characterized by such institutional instability ever since its founding in 1949. Time and again new political organizations and government agencies have popped up only to disappear quickly or lapse into disuse. After a quarter of a century, People's China still has no criminal code, civil code, or a formal code of legal procedure. In many respects, the political system remains revolutionary and provisional. Even the Communist Party, the keystone of the entire power structure before the Cultural Revolution, suffered devastation for six years, during which time only the People's Liberation Army appeared to maintain its institutional stability.

Although one might view the occurrence of another upheaval of the scope, intensity, and magnitude of the Cultural Revolution as unlikely, the new Constitution does reaffirm the theory of "continued revolution." This doubtless reflects the fear among some of Mao's followers that the cancer of "revisionism" may imperil the revolution. In the words of a leading Maoist spokesman, the danger comes not only from the overthrown landlord and capitalist classes hoping for a capitalist restoration but also from "newly engendered bourgeois elements . . . whose restorationist activities aim not at seizing back any means of production of which they have been dispossessed, but at grabbing means of production they have never possessed." [16] Such class contradictions, the Maoists feel, can be resolved only by "continued revolution."

On the other hand, China's economic program is to build "an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial economic system" by 1980 and achieve "the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology before the end of the century." [17] To this end, the Constitution calls for "self-reliance, hard struggle, diligence, and thrift," but these attitudes are not likely to bear fruit if rational economic development continues to be interrupted intermittently by disruptive ideological campaigns on the scale of the Cultural Revolution.

Factors relating to social and political cohesion, stability, the distribution of political power, and the acceptance of restored party authority are undergoing a process of testing and transition in the PRC today. China's future will depend in the long run not on the provisions of the new Constitution but rather on the ability of a new leadership to create a genuine national consensus and to generate a sense of positive commitment on the part of talented elements of the population.

[15] According to Article 9 of the CCP Constitution adopted by the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973. For the official English-language text of the CCP Constitution, see *Peking Review*, Sept. 7, 1973, pp. 26-29.

[16] Yao Wen-yuan, "On the Social Basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique," *ibid.*, March 7, 1975, pp. 5 and 9. The article originally appeared in *Hung Ch'i*, No. 3, 1975. See also Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie," *ibid.*, No. 4, 1975 (for an English translation, see *Peking Review*, April 4, 1975, pp. 5-11).

[17] Chou En-lai, "Report . . . ," *loc. cit.*, p. 23.

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Patterns of Nordic Communism

By Trond Gilberg

During the last decade, there has been a significant upswing of political radicalism in Western Europe. To many experts and laymen alike, this development has come as a major surprise, for they had predicted that the general spread of material prosperity in an increasingly industrialized world would dominate the soil in which radicalism flourishes and would thus bring on the "end of ideology." [1] The unexpected trend in the opposite direction has already begun to stimulate new research into the sources of political radicalism throughout the European area, and recent studies have tended to suggest that such radicalism may well arise from factors which are connected with but go beyond specific economic grievances. Much of the new political radicalism of the 1970's, for example, apparently stems from a vague yet powerful dissatification with modern industrial society. This discontent causes the dissidents to find economic improvements and social palliatives unsatisfactory and to urge nothing less than a complete restructuring of society.[2]

The Nordic states, which by and large enjoy high levels of socioeconomic development and are examples *par excellence* of modern welfare states, have been among the key barometers of the rise in political radicalism. Under such circumstances, one might expect that the local Communist parties there would have registered substantial gains over the last several years. In actuality, however, the fortunes of the various Nordic Communist parties have differed greatly. Some parties have established themselves as major entities on their national political scenes, while others have remained little more than shadows.

This article will explore the fortune of the parties in Norway, Denmark, and Iceland and the reasons behind the differences among them. (The situations of the parties in Finland and Sweden have already been covered in these pages.[3]) Because of the similarities in the experiences of the Norwegian and Danish parties, the article will treat them together and then look separately at the case of the Icelandic party.

Norway and Denmark: Background

Political radicalism has deeply-rooted traditions in Norway and Denmark. Throughout the long centuries of feudalism, there were sporadic peasant uprisings against landlords, both domestic and foreign. In the case of Norway, such uprisings were not merely an expression of economic grievances and social class differences but were a manifestation of nationalism in an era of Danish domination. The combination of radicalism and nationalism has remained a potent source of strength for the political left wing in that country and has also caused the Norwegian labor movement to develop somewhat differently from the Danish.

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[1] See, for instance, Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology,* New York, The Free Press, 1967.

[2] See, among others, Maurice W. Cranston, *The New Left: Six Critical Essays,* New York, Library Press, 1971.

[3] See John H. Hodgson, "Finnish Communism and Electoral Politics," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1974, pp. 34-45; Daniel Tarschys, "The Unique Role of the Swedish CP," *ibid.,* May-June 1974, pp. 36-44.

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The establishment of an organized working-class movement in the two countries can be dated to the middle of the 19th century. In both countries, it was the best-educated stratum of the emerging class that took the initiative to organize workingmen's groups, often with a base in the old guild organizations; usually, the printers and typesetters led the way, no doubt because of their higher literacy. By the fourth quarter of the century, the economic trade unionism of these groups combined with their increasing political orientation to pave the way for the establishment of political parties. The Norwegian Labor Party (DNA) was founded in 1887, and the Danish Social Democratic Party (SD) in 1871. Trade union confederations, umbrella organizations incorporating the various unions in each country, were established around the turn of the century. From the very beginning, the unions developed a close relationship with the political labor movement, a relationship which remains of primary importance today.[4]

From the outset, the DNA and the SD were caught up in the struggle between radicalism and revisionism that was raging in the international labor movement at the time. The basic core of the Norwegian party, after an initial period of support for the more radical slogans propounded by the First International, soon settled upon a course advocating reform and the pursuit of a peaceful road to socialism. The DNA obtained its first parliamentary representation in 1903, and until World War I the party continued to stress peaceful socioeconomic change.[5] The SD similarly embraced policies emphasizing revisionism, and by 1914 it had achieved sufficient electoral successes to boast several Danish socialist representatives in the Folketing (the Danish parliament).[6]

In Norway, the struggle for national independence and severance of the existing union with Sweden had been the overriding political issue in the 1890's. However, the attainment of independence in 1905 made it possible for the political parties of the country to turn to other issues, and their prior unity in the face of a common enemy soon evaporated. Moreover, the shift of the nation's energies toward economic development and the setting in of very rapid industrialization created favorable conditions for the appearance of strong leftist and anarcho-syndicalist tendencies among the new, raw proletariat, whose ranks expanded with astonishing rapidity.

These circumstances placed the situation in Norway in rather sharp contrast to that in Denmark, where a more mature economic system had existed previously and where the emergence of an industrial working class had been a slower process. Nonetheless, post-1905 economic developments in Norway and Denmark set the stage for new and more militant manifestations of leftism in both countries. In Denmark, the radical forces were unable to gather more than fringe support, either in the SD or in the trade unions, and moderate elements under the leadership of Thorvald Stauning remained in firm control throughout the entire period up to World War II. In Norway, on the other hand, various leftist groups based in the youth organizations of the DNA and in some unions soon gathered considerable strength and provided a fertile environment for the organized Communist factions of a later date.[7]

The Russian Revolution had a profound effect on the labor movements of the two countries. In Denmark, the development of the movement after 1917 followed the pattern standard in most West European countries. That is, a relatively small minority on the left split away from the mother party and formed the Danish Communist Party (DKP).

In Norway, events took a somewhat different turn. The leftist forces assumed control of the DNA at the party congress of 1918, and the Norwegian party joined the Comintern in 1919. In 1920, a split between leftists and moderates did occur, but in contrast to the Danish experience (and the general West European pattern), the moderates constituted a distinct minority, and the bulk of the DNA remained in the Third International.[8] However, the ascendancy of the leftist forces proved of short duration. The coalition of Communists, anarcho-syndicalist elements, and genuine supporters of the Russian Revolution that had captured the party *apparat* in 1918 could not survive the incessant attempts of the Soviet Communist Party and the Comintern Executive to "bolshevize" the party, and

[4] For background, see Trond Gilberg, *The Soviet Communist Party and Scandinavian Communism: The Norwegian Case*, Oslo, University of Oslo Press, 1973, p. 14; Peter R. Rohde, "The Communist Party of Denmark," in A.F. Upton, Ed., *Communism in Scandinavia and Finland: Politics of Opportunity*, New York, Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973, p. 3; Gunnar Ousland and Alfred Skar, *Fagorganisasjonen i Norge* (The Trade Union Organization in Norway), 4 Vols., Oslo, I Kommisjon Hos Tiden, 1949.

[5] Gilberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-23.

[6] Rohde, *loc. cit.*, pp. 3-7.

[7] See, e.g., Halvdan Koht *et al.*, *Det Norske Arbeiderpartis Historie* (History of the Norwegian Labor Party), Oslo, Det Norske Arbeiderpartis Forlag, 1937, Vol. I, pp. 96-130.

[8] Gilberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-59.

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in November 1923 the DNA split again—this time in the "classical" fashion, with a minority left wing seceding and the moderate bulk of the membership and party *apparat* staying in the mother party. The new left-wing party dubbed itself the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) and became a loyal branch of the Comintern.

Despite the dissimilarities in the births of the Danish and Norwegian Communist parties, both fared pretty much the same throughout the 1920's and 1930's. The DKP remained a fringe group, unable to gather much organizational or electoral strength. For example, it obtained 0.4 percent of the total electoral vote in 1926, 0.2 percent in 1929, 1.6 percent in 1935, and 2.4 percent in 1939.[9] Furthermore, the Social Democrats made sure that Communist influence remained minimal in the mass organizations of the labor movement.[10] The NKP started off better but soon declined in strength. In 1924, the first year in which the party participated in an election as an independent entity, it received the support of 6 percent of the electorate. By 1927, however, the figure had declined to 4 percent, and it continued to fall in subsequent years —to 1.4 percent in 1930 and 0.3 percent in 1936.

World War II and the Postwar Era

The isolation of the two Communist parties in their own societies was at least temporarily overcome by the highly visible anti-Nazi struggle undertaken by the DKP and the NKP after an initial period of limited collaboration with the Germans during 1940. The domestic underground activity of the Scandinavian Communists and the tremendous rise in Soviet prestige all over Europe during World War II combined to create a favorable climate for the two parties in the immediate postwar period. Thus, both the NKP and the DKP participated briefly in coalition governments in 1945, and their showings in the parliamentary elections of that fall were their best ever (12.4 percent of the total vote for the DKP and 12.0 percent for the NKP).[11]

Yet almost immediately the Communists in both countries launched policies which were destined to lead them into isolation once more. The spirit of cooperation and unity of the working class, which had been so evident in the summer and fall of 1945, gave way to sharp attacks by the Communists on the Social Democrats and attempts to infiltrate and control the working-class mass organizations. Such efforts acquired ominous overtones after the Soviet-backed Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe and the proclamation of the two-camp theory in the late 1940's. The anti-Titoist purges that swept both the DKP and the NKP toward the end of the 1940's, as well as their unquestioning support of the North Koreans and the Soviet Union in the Korean conflict, further strengthened the public image of the parties as mere appendages of Soviet foreign policy.

By the mid-1950's, then, the DKP and NKP were back to their prewar status, constituting isolated, dogmatic sects of true believers on the fringes of the Danish and Norwegian political systems. Their declining positions were most vividly reflected in the shares of the vote that they received in local postwar elections. The DKP garnered about 6 percent of the national vote in Denmark in 1947, 4.6 percent in 1950, 4.6 and 4.3 percent in the two elections of 1953, and only 3.1 percent in 1957. Similarly, the NKP won 6 percent of the national vote in Norway in 1949 and 5 percent in 1953.[12]

The events of the decade 1955-65 produced new problems for the DKP and the NKP. Khrushchev's destalinization campaign in the Soviet Union reverberated through the Scandinavian parties as well, dividing the already miniscule membership (never more than a few thousand from the early 1950's onward) into "Stalinists" and "reformers." The Sino-Soviet rift further aggravated the internal problems of both parties—especially the NKP, out of whose ranks a rather important pro-Chinese faction emerged.[13]

In the Danish party, a reformist faction loyal to the erstwhile DKP chairman Aksel Larsen broke away and formed the Socialist People's Party

[9] Information on the electoral record of the Communist parties presented in this paragraph and later in the paper is derived from a variety of sources—primarily the statistical yearbooks of Denmark and Norway for the years when elections were held. In Norway, the statistical yearbooks are published by the Statistisk Sentralbyrå under the title *Statistisk Årbok for Kongeriket Norge;* in Denmark, they are issued by the Statistiske Bureau under the title *Statistisk Aarbog for Kongeriget Danmark.* (It should be noted that while these titles have been the ones most frequently used, there have been slight variations in the exact titles over the years.)

[10] Rohde, *loc. cit.*, pp. 8-12.

[11] See footnote 9. The NKP won 12 seats and the DKP 18 seats in their respective parliaments: see Gilberg, *op. cit.*, p. 212, and Rohde, *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

[12] See footnote 9.

[13] For a discussion of internal factionalism in the NKP, see an article by party chairman Reidar Larsen in the labor daily, *Arbeiderbladet* (Oslo), Jan. 14, 1967.

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(*Socialistisk Folkeparti,* or SF) in 1959. The SF soon outstripped the DKP both in membership and electoral support and threatened to eliminate the truncated Communist Party from Danish politics altogether.[14] Comparable problems faced the Norwegian party. A left-wing group of the Labor Party (DNA) left the Laborites and formed a Norwegian version of the Socialist People's Party (SF) in 1961. Although the Danish and Norwegian SF's had sprung from different sources, they constituted similar dangers to the two Communist parties, in that they were powerful groups with leftist appeal, located to the immediate right of the Scandinavian Communists ideologically, and thus potentially formidable rivals for left-wing support.[15]

Not only were the DKP and the NKP challenged from the right by the emergence of the two SF parties, but they were also challenged from the left by various and sundry ultraradical groups with Maoist and Trotskyist programs. The result was a further erosion of support for the Communists. In 1960, the DKP captured only 1.1 percent of the national vote in Denmark, and by the mid-1960's (1966) the figure had dropped to less than 1 percent. The NKP received 3 percent of the national vote in Norway in 1961 and just 1.4 percent in 1965.[16]

By the mid-1960's, the two Scandinavian parties seemed to have reached a watershed in their political fortunes; indeed, they appeared to be on the brink of political annihilation. The problems they confronted seemed to defy solution. They were in a state of isolation both within the labor movement and within society at large in their respective countries. Regarded by the general public as lackeys of Moscow, they seemed unable to reconcile the contradiction between their allegiance to an international, ostensibly "ideological" movement and their acute need to develop appeal on the basis of proposed solutions to national issues. Intraparty splits and factional activity severely hampered their political and organizational abilities, and the policy decisions of their leaders were under constant attack from "fundamentalists" on the left and "revisionists" on the right. In this situation, it seems very likely that they might actually have expired, had not a number of developments—both international and internal in nature—presented them with some new opportunities to seek support and at least maintain a foothold in the political arena. What were these opportunities, and to what degree have the two parties succeeded or failed to take advantage of them?

[14] For a discussion of the relative strengths of the DKP and the SF, see *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1968,* Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1969, p. 180, and subsequent editions of the yearbook.

[15] The two Communist parties have in fact perceived the two SF's as just such a threat on many occasions and for many years campaigned more actively against those parties than against the Social Democrats.

[16] See footnote 9.

The Shifting Scene: 1965-75

The potential for new Communist activity in the years since 1965 has derived from four major sources.

Big Power Policies. First of all, the decade has been marked by the gradual but determined move toward détente between East and West—and thus the close of the long years of the "cold war." The era of ideological confrontation had been a primary factor in the movement of Denmark and Norway away from neutrality to full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Needless to say, it had also added immeasurably to the difficulties of the local Communist parties. To be a Communist in the cold-war years was to be regarded as a Trojan horse, a spokesman for an alien faith, an unquestioning supporter of a political system whose expansionism had subjugated almost all of Eastern Europe and threatened to engulf the Western part of the continent as well.

With the advent of détente, the Soviet Union came to be viewed as a more responsible power, whose expansionism (if ever a reality) had given way to the aim of peaceful consolidation of territorial gains already achieved and a willingness to cooperate with the United States and the West European nations to maintain peace and to expand mutually beneficial economic relations. The cause of détente got a big boost from the fact that just as the Soviet Union was beginning to act "responsibly" in Europe and elsewhere, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution swept the People's Republic of China, making Peking's policies appear to be the epitome of irrationality. For the first time, a distinction was made between "good"/"rational" Communists and "irrational"/"dangerous" ones, and Communists parties which were closely identified with the Soviet Union, as were the DKP and the NKP, stood to gain in public estimation and respectability.

Other factors also helped to puncture the myth of Communist monolithism. The Soviet grip on

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Eastern Europe was loosening, and the elements of terror and coercion that had loomed so large in Communist regimes of the Stalinist period had given way to an emphasis on more "administrative" methods of dictatorship. By the mid-1960's, some of the countries in the area were beginning to emerge from the shadow of Moscow in foreign policy; in particular, the Romanians were beginning to conduct a policy *vis-à-vis* non-Communist Europe which emphasized cooperation rather than competition and conflict. In Czechoslovakia, an economic reform movement was beginning to have significant political effects. And in Western Europe, more and more Communist parties were beginning to articulate their own roads to socialism, following the example of the Yugoslavs and the Italian Communists, who became the most vociferous proponents of polycentrism and national communism.[17] These were certainly developments which made it less feasible to dismiss West European Communists as "errand boys of Moscow."

While the Soviet Union and international communism were becoming more respectable in the eyes of many Danes and Norwegians, the United States was undergoing a serious setback in Scandinavian public opinion. The American involvement in Vietnam severely damaged the US image in all the Scandinavian countries. Even normally staunch supporters of Washington criticized the buildup of American forces in Indochina, and this criticism increased in intensity after the United States commenced its air war in the North. On the political left in Norway and Denmark, numerous groups sprang up with a program of opposition to US policies in Vietnam and support for the Vietcong. Public opinion, although divided, by and large accepted the condemnation of the Americans' role in Indochina, and this outlook made it easier for groups normally considered pro-Soviet to gain a measure of legitimacy.

Internal Political Trends. The second factor that has presented potential opportunities for Communist exploitation has been the "bourgeoisization" of Scandinavian social democracy—a trend that has provided groups of a more leftist orientation with the possibility of billing themselves as left-wing alternatives to the "social renegades."

During most of the post-World War II period, the Norwegian Labor Party and the Danish Social Democratic Party (DNA and SD, respectively) had effectively blocked the local Communists from acquiring any mass following. These large and cohesive parties simply monopolized the political left and consigned organized communism to the fringes of the political system.

At the same time, the Social Democrats in both countries had moved perceptively toward the political center in a quest for the support of the growing white-collar work force and the presumed growing body of moderate opinion. This development had ensured continued Social Democratic predominance in Norway and Denmark, insofar as the two parties remained the largest in their respective countries; but it had also engendered a considerable amount of dissatisfaction among the more orthodox, ideological adherents of both parties. It was widely felt that the DNA and the SD were abandoning "socialism," were moving toward a leftist form of "bourgeois capitalism," and had in fact given up the idea of achieving "socialist democracy," even in the distant future. In Norway, this situation had already resulted in the aforementioned split in the DNA and the establishment of the Socialist People's Party (SF); in Denmark, a similar party had been established somewhat earlier, though—as noted—the bulk of the Danish SF had come from the DKP, not the Social Democrats. Further splits occurred in the post-1965 period.[18]

The appearance of these new leftist political entities posed both dangers and opportunities for the Communists in Denmark and Norway. The dangers lay in the possibility that the SF's in the two countries would absorb the support of the left wing of Norwegian and Danish social democracy, thereby depriving the CP's of a chance to promote themselves as a left-wing alternative to the "bourgeois" Social Democrats; the opportunities related chiefly to possible cooperation between the Communists and the SF parties, either in electoral coalitions or inside trade unions or other mass organizations.

The EEC Issue. A third factor that created fresh opportunities for the DKP and NKP was the acrimonious issue of whether the Scandinavian countries should join the European Common Market (or European Economic Community—EEC). In both

[17] The Swedish Communist Party's movement toward political autonomy affords a good illustration. For the most thorough discussion of this trend, see Åke Sparring, *Från Höglund till Hermansson: Om Revisionismen i Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti* (From Hoglund to Hermansson: About the Revisionism in the Swedish Communist Party), Stockholm, Bonniers, 1967.

[18] Serious splits in the last decade have fragmented the Danish Left into at least 10 parties and political groups and the Norwegian Left into at least seven such groups (as will be discussed later in this paper).

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Norway and Denmark, the question of membership in the EEC produced protracted and unprecedented debates over national peculiarities versus greater European integration. The debate became especially far-ranging in Norway; raging with uncharacteristic fury in the country's otherwise rather staid political system, the controversy came to a dramatic head with an "advisory referendum" in 1972, in which a solid majority of the population (55 percent) voted against membership.[19]

During the period preceding the referendum in Norway, a significant reorientation of political allegiances took place, the long-range dimensions of which can be perceived only dimly at the present time. The EEC controversy was particularly problematical for the Social Democrats. The top leadership of the party and the trade unions, as well as the bulk of the DNA representatives in parliament, argued for Norwegian membership in the Common Market; they maintained that to stand outside such a massive economic market would place Norwegian industry and shipping in a very dangerous situation. Joining the Social Democrats in this stance were the conservatives, some of the liberals, and assorted other political groups commonly associated with right-of-center politics. Organized business, finance, and shipping interests also urged the pro-EEC course. Against this coalition was arrayed a motley collection of political forces ranging from the generally conservative farmers' interest groups and the Center Party (formerly Agrarians), through the nationalistically-oriented section of the Liberal Party, to the Social Democratic youth organization, the SF, the NKP, and the numerous splinter groups to the left of the Communists. It soon turned out that the majority of the rank and file of the DNA and the trade unions shared the anti-EEC views of the agrarian/left-wing coalition.

The split between the DNA leadership and large elements of the party's rank and file resulted in a massive defection from the Social Democratic standard in national elections held in September 1973. Many of the traditional supporters of the DNA apparently voted for the Socialist Electoral Alliance (*Sosialistisk Valgforbund,* or SV), a leftist political alliance which included the Norwegian Communists. The defection brought about a serious loss of Social Democratic seats in the parliament (12 of 74) and a dramatic gain for the SV (which, with no previous experience as an electoral coalition, won 16 of the total 150 seats).[20]

Despite the considerable blow suffered by the Laborities, the DNA remained by far the largest in the Storting (the Norwegian parliament) and was in fact called upon to form a government. Thus, in one of those ironic twists that occasionally beset parliamentary systems, the biggest losers in the election ended up in the driver's seat of a minority government. For the NKP, as one of the main members of the SV electoral alliance, the formation of a Social Democratic minority regime provided a welcome opportunity to exercise some influence on its erstwhile archenemy, to the extent that the DNA had to rely on SV support for its program. The result has been a considerable turn to the left in the Laborites' policies, a development for which the NKP has noisily claimed a major share of the credit.[21]

Political Polarization. Finally, the emerging polarization in the Scandinavian welfare state systems has created opportunities for both the local Communists and other leftist groups to wage class politics.

The erroneous expectation that political radicalism would gradually wither away in modern society—a notion discussed at the outset of this paper—was based on the logic that with the development of social welfare states and growing prosperity, the general public would become increasingly middle-class in social status and economic position, and public opinion would cluster in the middle of the ideological spectrum.[22] Political trends in Western Europe—including Norway, Denmark, and Sweden—during the last decade have disproved this notion; in fact, it now appears that prosperous welfare states may be especially prone to the upheavals of a new form of radicalism originating precisely in the middle class and leading to the polarization of the entire political system.

Systematic research is beginning to unravel some of the causes of this phenomenon. The extensive social services of the welfare state are based upon heavy taxation, a disproportionate share of which is borne by the middle-class "salariat." In such a

[19] A thorough examination of this important referendum is currently being conducted by the Institute for Political Science at the University of Oslo, under the leadership of Professor Henry Valen.

[20] *Arbeiderbladet,* Sept. 12 and 13, 1973.

[21] An example of this trend is the current campaign by the DNA to establish greater control over the banking system.

[22] For specific application of this notion to the Nordic countries, see Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1961, and his *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966.

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*Members of the Socialist Electoral Alliance (*Sosialistisk Valgforbund—*SV) meet the press in Oslo on April 21, 1974, after an SV National Conference: seated, from the left, Ove Larsen; Berit Ås; Finn Gustavsen, head of the parliamentary group of the Socialist People's Party* (Sosialistisk Folkeparti—*SF); Reidar T. Larsen, Chairman of the Norwegian Communist Party; and Stein Örnhöi; standing, Roald Halvorsen, SV daily leader.*

—Norsk Telegrambyrå Billedarkivet.

system, a significant leveling takes place; income differentation is offset by a broad program of pensions, services, and grants that lifts the lower socioeconomic strata up to a level of income, from direct and indirect sources, which is not drastically different from that of the lower middle class. The very rich, on the other hand, enjoy a number of opportunities to utilize tax loopholes and write-offs not available to the salaried middle class. Middle-class discontent over this situation is aggravated by the fact that the Social Democratic parties of Scandinavia, the dominant political forces in their respective countries for 30 years, have continued to verbalize strong commitments to social and economic egalitarianism.[23]

[23] See, *e.g.*, Gilberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-12.

Since the late 1960's, there have been many indications that the limit of taxpayer tolerance may have been reached in Scandinavia. In Denmark, a full-fledged "Poujadist" party emerged, whose program included demands for a significant reduction of taxes, the dismantling of a considerable part of the welfare state bureaucracy and its programs, and a vigorous campaign to put "slackers" back to work. There were elements of flippancy in the party's proposals (its leader, Mogens Glistrup, suggested—for example—that the defense budget could be virtually eliminated and replaced with an automatic telephone service which would declare "I surrender" in Russian); but many people apparently felt seriously enough about the issues involved to register a protest vote by endorsing the party's program in the Danish elections of the 1970's. In fact, studies

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have indicated that a substantial number of traditional Social Democrats voted for the Glistrup party, a sign that political discontent had affected the outlook of the working class as well as that of the bourgeoisie.[24]

In Norway, such protest moves centered around a similar new party, the Anders Large's Party (ALP), named after its founder. The ALP emphasized many of the ideas of the Danish "Glistrupites," with a generous dose of national chauvinism thrown in. It obtained four seats in the Storting in the 1973 election, apparently drawing much of its strength from traditional supporters of the DNA as well as rightists. Again, the vote seemed to express resentment of the top-heavy bureaucracy of the welfare state on the part of a substantial cross-section of the population.[25]

The established parties in Denmark and Norway were considerably embarrassed by the emergence of the Glistrup group and the ALP, and in the resulting political polarization, elements of old-fashioned, class-struggle rhetoric reverberated through the erstwhile moderate systems. Such a climate provided new chances for leftist radicals to promote political platforms couched in the language of class warfare and of defense against the onslaught of "reaction."

Communist Responses

Over the past decade, the Danish and Norwegian Communists have pursued a variety of policies and tactics in an attempt to exploit the new political opportunities created by these international and internal developments. Despite their determined efforts, both parties have in large measure failed to expand their influence (for reasons to be discussed); they have, however, managed to maintain themselves as live and certainly vocal minorities on the political left.

The DKP and the NKP reacted to the erosion of Soviet ideological hegemony in quite different ways. Initially, the DKP, under its chairman Knud Jespersen, followed a revisionist line, emphasizing the need to build socialism and communism in Denmark in accordance with local conditions. In 1968, the party supported the Dubcek reform movement and deplored the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia as "unnecessary and unwarranted." In the aftershock of that event, however, the DKP moved increasingly back toward the position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on matters of international communism.

Since the early 1970's, the Danish party leadership has shifted to a stance expressing a qualified, retrospective endorsement of the invasion and referring to the subsequent "restoration" of Czechoslovak society. The DKP has also accepted the call for another international conference of Communist parties, currently touted as a "necessity" by many of the pro-Soviet parties in Western Europe (no doubt at the request of the Kremlin). Its leadership has strongly criticized the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in language very similar to that employed by Moscow. The DKP's positions on détente, Danish neutrality, mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR), and European security likewise bear a striking resemblance to the views expressed by the Soviet leadership on these questions. In short, the DKP routinely supports the formal stances of Soviet foreign policy.[26]

In contrast, the Norwegian Communists have steadfastly adhered to an independent posture *vis-à-vis* Moscow. Under the leadership of party chairman Reidar Larsen, the NKP adopted and has continued to pursue a revisionist course of "national communism," insisting on the right of every party to establish its own road to socialism—a stance which was first struck in Scandinavia by the Swedish Communist leader, C. H. Hermansson. Predictably, the Norwegian Communists denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia as a "major tradegy" for international communism, and they have not since retreated from this position. They have become increasingly critical of Moscow's attempts to reestablish itself as the center of world communism, maintaining that there should be no one leader of the international movement. By the same token, they have attempted to be even-handed in their treatment of the Sino-Soviet dispute, outlining the two sides of the confrontation but also criticizing both Moscow and Peking for infighting at a time when all "progressive" forces should be united in the struggle against "imperialism." While the NKP has been

[24] See Werner Kaltefleiter, *Ein Doppelter Protestwahl* (A Double Protest Vote), Alfter, Der Konrad Adenauer Institut für Empirische Sozial-Forschung, 1974.

[25] The significance of the vote was analyzed by Professor Henry Valen of the University of Oslo in an interview with the author in October 1974.

[26] For an example of the party's complete acceptance of the Soviet position on European security, see *Land og Folk* (Copenhagen), Feb. 5 and 6, 1972.

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noncommittal on the question of whether a new world conference of Communists should be held, it has insisted that such a gathering should not be used as a forum for condemning any single party—obviously, a reference to the Chinese CP. Finally, the NKP has not hesitated on occasion to criticize certain aspects of domestic politics in the Soviet Union, such as the treatment of dissenters, as well as some of the stances of Soviet foreign policy—criticisms that would be unthinkable to the Danish Communists.[27]

There is a rather striking similarity in the postures of the NKP and the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) on matters of international communism, and it is symptomatic that the NKP has had frequent contact with the Romanian leadership, whereas Jespersen of the DKP has engaged in frequent consultations with the East Germans and directly with the CPSU.[28] Likewise, the NKP position on MBFR and European security is rather similar to that of Romania, emphasizing the need for a "European" solution that avoids excessive control by the big powers.[29]

Internal Tactics and Failures

The attempts of the DKP and the NKP to adapt to the changing domestic scene—and in the case of the NKP especially, to establish a national profile—have clearly been aimed at breaking out of the isolation that has long characterized the two small parties, both in the labor movements and in the political systems of their countries. Their tactics in this direction have fallen into several categories: efforts to develop a new image as responsible political organizations and to improve relations with other parties on the left; attempts to get a foothold in the trade unions; and moves to establish a role in the mass protest movements that have sprung up over the last decade. By and large, these tactics have produced disappointing results.

The Communists' major effort was to move toward closer cooperation, formally and informally, with the Social Democrats. For most of their political lives up to the mid-1960's, the DKP and NKP had treated the Social Democratic parties, the DNA and the SD, as dangerous forces which in fact worked against the "revolutionary" unity of the working class. Communist hostility was directed against the Social Democrats both as the leading socialist parties and as the dominant members of successive governmental coalitions in Denmark and Norway. During the past decade, however, the Communists launched a determined move to tone down controversy and to extend qualified support to the Social Democrats. As part of this approach, they adopted the slogan of "working-class unitary action"; according to Communist spokesmen, this meant that the DKP and NKP would retain their own organizations and reserved the right to struggle against other "socialist" forces—in particular, the Social Democratic parties—on selected issues, but recognized that "non-socialist" forces were more dangerous to Communist interests. Thus, "action in unity" emerged as a course to be pursued for the fulfillment of specific goals.[30] As a result, the Communists came to support many of the pet projects of the Social Democrats in social and economic legislation.

Initially, the Communist parties also followed the Social Democratic lead in deploring the fragmentation of the Left which had earlier given rise to the aforementioned SF parties and later produced another Danish splinter party, the Left Socialists (*Venstresocialisterne*, or VS), a group which broke off from the Danish SF in 1967 over the issue of the latter's alleged revisionism. The Norwegian Communists also consistently condemned the SF youth organization, the Socialist Youth League (*Sosialistisk Ungdomsforbund,* or SUF) as a "sectarian movement."

But by the beginning of the 1970's, the continued failure of the Danish and Norwegian Communists to establish working agreements with the Social Democratic parties caused them to turn their attention to possible cooperation with the SF parties. After initial rebuffs, the Norwegian CP managed to establish an alliance with the local SF in advance of the parliamentary elections of 1973, resulting in the formation of the SV (*Sosialistisk Valgforbund*—Socialist Electoral Alliance); as noted earlier, this coalition won 12 parliamentary seats in the elections and put Communists in the Storting for the first time since the 1960's. In Denmark, however, the

[27] *E.g.*, see *Friheten* (Oslo), Aug. 21-26, 1972.

[28] NKP leader Larsen has repeatedly emphasized that the Swedish, Italian, and Romanian parties are the "models" most appropriate for the NKP.

[29] These themes were repeatedly stressed by Larsen on Norwegian television during the electoral campaign of 1973.

[30] The basic approach of the DKP in this field was defined in the party's "theses" prepared for its 24th Congress; see *Land og Folk,* May 19, 1972. For an expression of the NKP's approach to "action in unity," see *Friheten,* June 12-17, 1972.

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DKP has not had much more success approaching the SF than it did the SD.

Another major area of concern for the Scandinavian CP's has been the trade unions. Both in Denmark and in Norway the unions are well organized and represent tremendous economic and political power; thus, it is only natural that leftist political parties should make an effort to gain "a piece of the action." The problem for the Scandinavian Communists is that both the national unions and the trade union federations have traditionally been either directly controlled or strongly influenced by the Social Democrats. In this situation, the chief thrust of Communist policies vis-à-vis the unions during the last decade has been to promote the notion that union organizations should be politically "neutral," in the sense that they should not maintain direct party allegiances. Presumably, the Communists reasoned that the reduction of union-party ties, combined with the appeal for "action in unity" on specific goals, might open up the possibility of Communist infiltration "from below" in at least some national union organizations. So far such efforts have borne little fruit: not one of the many national unions in either country is controlled by Communists,[31] and only a few locals (mainly organizations of longshoremen and of workers in the construction

[31] The strongest showing in this respect has been by the DKP in the Danish metalworkers' union, where the Communists have achieved representation on the national council. See *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1973*, p. 136.

Leftist members of the Danish Parliament: Knud Jespersen, right, Chairman of the Danish Communist Party, and Sigurd Ömann, of the Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti—*SF), are interviewed on February 12, 1974, during a demonstration of solidarity with demands of striking workers at a Jutland area computer plant for greater worker participation in management.*

—Nordisk via Pictorial Parade.

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trades and transportation) have significant Communist representation in their leadership structures.

The Communists have also applied the notion of "action in unity" in endeavoring to exploit the aforementioned phenomena of increasing anti-Americanism, political polarization, and controversy over the issue of Scandinavian participation in the Common Market. In both Denmark and Norway, the Communists have participated in many of the mass movements organized over the past decade—especially groups formed to protest US involvement in Vietnam; groups expressing solidarity with the Vietcong and Hanoi; groups pressing for "peace" and "neutrality" (*e.g., Norge ut av NATO*—Norway out of NATO); and a number of groups with narrower targets, such as organized protest movements against the Greek military regime (prior to its collapse in 1974). Communist participation in such organizations was clearly designed to demonstrate that the DKP and the NKP could be reliable and cooperative allies in "progressive" causes.[32] But the Communists' prominent role in these forms of protest activity has not enabled them to penetrate to the leadership levels of the mass movements or to attract many new adherents to their own cause.[33]

Persisting Isolation and Its Causes

Thus, despite the many opportunities that invited an upsurge in leftist radical influence over the last decade, neither the Danish nor the Norwegian Communists have managed to increase their strength to any significant degree or to make much headway in breaking out of their political and social isolation. The membership of both parties remains at the level of a few thousand: each claims 4,000-6,000 members, but other sources estimate their respective strengths at about half that number.[34] In elections, the two parties have continued to capture only a miniscule share of the votes. The DKP's electoral support rose by a hair to all of 1 percent in 1968 and has hovered at that level in the 1970's. The NKP also registered a vote of 1 percent in the 1969 elections. While its participation in the SV alliance in the elections of 1973 represented an undoubted victory for the Communists, the proportion of the total SV vote contributed by the NKP was probably not much greater than that which it won on its own during the 1960's (recent Gallup poll figures have shown a support base for the party amounting to 1.0-1.5 percent of the electorate.[35])

The reasons for the Communist parties' persisting inability to expand their influence are largely rooted in the same problems that have plagued them in the past. These include internal factionalism, organizational fragmentation, and the effectiveness of the competition both to their right and to their left.

Both the DKP and the NKP have continued to experience severe strains as a result of ideological fragmentation inside their own structures. In Denmark, there has been an increase in the pro-Chinese faction of the party; moreover, some of the leading Maoists have joined one or another of the many small groups in existence on the Danish left. In Norway, the "centrist" position of party leader Reidar Larsen resulted in the formation of a pro-Soviet group in the mid-to-late 1960's. This group attempted to unseat Larsen but failed, and its members, so-called "Stalinists," found themselves stripped of most of their functions (although not their membership). During the 1970's, an increasingly vocal Maoist faction also challenged Larsen's position and established close relations with several smaller Maoist groups. It even took over one of the most important locals of the NKP, the Oslo East branch. This development precipitated the expulsion of its members from the party (Larsen's formulation was that they had "excluded themselves" from the NKP).[36]

The extreme factionalism on the Danish and Norwegian left has produced a most confusing welter of groups, all of which compete with each other in a variety of ways. In Denmark, the DKP must share the field with the following organizations: the Socialist People's Party (SF); the Left Socialists (*Venstresocialisterne,* or VS); the Communist League/Marxist-Leninist (*Kommunistisk Forbund/Marxistisk-Leninistisk,* or KFML); the Communist Youth/Marxist-Leninist (*Kommunistisk Ungdom/Marxistisk-Leninistisk,* or KUML); the Communist Labor

[32] As part of such efforts, the Communist parties castigated many of the Maoist organizations as "sandbox radicals" while billing themselves as "responsible" political organizations. See, *e.g., Land og Folk,* Aug. 21, 1968.

[33] The mass organizations have remained under the control of the SD and SF in Denmark and of the DNA and the SF in Norway.

[34] See *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1973,* pp. 135 and 207.

[35] Gallup polls are conducted each month and published in all major dailies; the main sources for this article have been *Arbeiderbladet* and *Politiken* (Copenhagen).

[36] See *Klassekampen* (Oslo), No. 9, September 1970.

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Circle (*Kommunistisk Arbejdskreds,* or KAK); the Communist Youth League (*Kommunistisk Ungdomsforbund,* or KUK); the Socialist Youth League (*Socialistisk Ungdoms Forbund,* or SUF); the Revolutionary Socialists (*Revolutionaere Socialister,* or RS), and the Communist Youth of Denmark (*Danmarks Kommunistiske Ungdom,* or DKU). Of all these groups, only the DKU is directly affiliated with the Danish Communist Party. The others, though miniscule in size, are nevertheless critical of many of the policies emanating from the Communist Party, and this has weakened the appeal of the DKP on the Danish left.[37]

The Norwegian Left is equally fragmented. Besides the NKP, the following organizations exist: the Socialist People's Party (SF); the Norwegian Communist Youth League (*Norges Kommunistiske Ungdomsforbund,* or NKU), which split from the NKP in the late 1960's; Communist Youth (*Kommunistisk Undgom,* or KU), the NKP's youth organization after the split; the Socialist Youth League/Marxist-Leninist (*Sosialistisk Ungdomsforbund/Marxistisk-Leninistisk,* or SUF/ML); the Socialist Youth League (*Sosialistisk Ungdomsforbund,* or SUF); the Marxist-Leninist Group (*Marxistisk-Leninistisk Gruppe,* or MLG); and several discussion groups, consisting primarily of intellectuals. In 1973, a number of other smaller groups were formed, some of which joined forces with the NKP and SF in the Socialist Electoral Alliance (SV). Of all the groups mentioned above, only KU is directly affiliated with the NKP, while most of the others are Maoist groups with a degree of influence—especially among students—but with very small memberships.[38]

In view of such fragmentation, it is small wonder that the two Communist parties have not managed to make much headway in breaking out of their traditional isolation. Another contributory factor, however, has been the effectiveness with which other left-of-center groups have responded to changing conditions and have formulated policies designed to enhance their own influence. In both countries, the anti-war movements, the neutralist groups, and the anti-Common Market forces have at all times been controlled by non-Communist elements, primarily the Social Democrats and the SF parties. There has been a widespread feeling among non-Communist socialists that enterprises which must of necessity depend upon support from non-socialist strata of the population should not have Communist leaders, since large sectors of the Danish and Norwegian publics still consider the local Communist parties essentially alien entities. Indeed, the trade union leaders, who have provided a substantial amount of the money that the mass organizations have needed to operate, have emphatically insisted that Communist influence in these organizations be kept to a minimum.[39] Because the non-Communist, left-of-center parties have been much larger than the DKP and the NKP and have had a substantial fund of organizers and monetary resources at their disposal, they have managed to prevent any major infiltration of the leadership of the mass movements by the erstwhile "sectarians" in the Communist parties.

Frustrated in their attempts to gain access to a broader clientele through the various mass movements, the Danish and Norwegian Communists turned to the increasingly crowded field of competition for the support of the "real" radicals. There, the Communists have been upstaged by the many Maoist groups, which charged that the DKP and the NKP had become "the left wing of the bourgeoisie"—that they were ossified structures led by old and tired apparatchiks who were unable to understand the new radicalism of the 1960's and the 1970's and who continued to idealize the dismal "state capitalism" of the Soviet Union.[40]

In the face of such charges, Larsen and Jespersen have attempted to bill themselves and their parties as "responsible" leaders and organizations far removed from the "sandbox hotheads" of the extreme left-wing groups. But such appeals to the more moderate left-wing tendencies in Denmark and Norway have been easily rebuffed by the DNA, the SD, and the two SF's, which could claim—with considerable justification—that only their groups stood a chance of achieving political power at the national level and thereby turning political platforms into actual policies.[41]

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[37] Information on Danish factions is from numerous publications, chiefly *Land og Folk* and *Tiden* (Copenhagen), and also *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs,* for the years 1968 through 1974.

[38] The information on Norwegian factions is from numerous publications, chiefly *Arbeiderbladet, Friheten, Orientering* (Oslo), *Klassekampen, Röde Garde* (Oslo), as well as the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs,* 1968 through 1974.

[39] This line has emerged clearly in *Fri Fagbevegelse* (The Free Trade Union Movement—Oslo), organ of the Norwegian Trade Union Federation.

[40] See, *e.g., Klasskampen,* No. 4, March 1970.

[41] The aforementioned 1973 electoral coalition, including both the SF and NKP in the SV, is an exception, but the NKP has played a relatively minor role in the SF-dominated organization.

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Thus, the DKP and the NKP find themselves essentially caught in a bind. For a large sector of Danish and Norwegian public opinion, the two parties remain fundamentally alien elements, and their efforts to establish a more moderate image have had little effect. On the other hand, these very efforts make the two Communist parties appear as "traitors" to the radical left-wingers in the two countries, a development which has further reduced the political options available to them. So far, neither Jespersen nor Larsen has been able to produce a program that can overcome this fundamental dilemma underlying the multitude of problems besetting Danish and Norwegian communism in the 1970's.

Iceland: Roots of Radicalism

Like Norway and Denmark, Iceland has a substantial tradition of native radicalism, but the sources of that tradition differ considerably from those in the Norwegian and Danish cases. Iceland has remained largely a society of fishermen and small farmers. While it has some industry, this is primarily of the consumer goods and food processing varieties, with the heavy and extractive components so important to Norway and Denmark (especially the former) largely lacking. At the same time, there has always been plenty of radicalism among the rural poor and the marginal farmers and fishermen.

In fact, Iceland seems to afford a good example of so-called "wilderness communism," which has been extensively analyzed with respect to Finland.[42] According to this analysis, communism in Scandinavia has not been primarily an urban movement, for the strong Social Democratic parties and trade union organizations in the cities have effectively precluded mass support for other left-wing movements. In the poorer rural areas, on the other hand, lumberjacks, marginal farmers, and people in closely-knit fishing villages have tended to exhibit considerable radicalism and an inclination to vote for Communists.[43]

Analysts studying this phenomenon have suggested a couple of reasons for such behavior. First, the rural population is rather scattered because its members work in different areas, and this dispersion makes organization into large groups difficult. If living conditions are hard and the social structure appears inequitable, radicalism may develop as an individualized revolt against the existing system, with few countervailing forces to stem it. Second, in close-knit communities such as small fishing villages, opposite trends occur. Social pressure from the community (where everybody knows everybody else) produces a tendency toward uniformity of political behavior, and if radicalism gains a foothold in such a small society, it tends to become solidly entrenched and to be passed down from generation to generation.[44]

Two other factors have also contributed to the strength of Icelandic radicalism—namely, a fairly egalitarian culture and a fervent nationalism. In regard to the former, one should observe that while early Icelandic society was stratified, with a system of free farmers and slaves, there were few nobles or absentee landowners among the Icelanders. The foreign landlords were Danish, and the native farmers and fishermen felt keenly that they were equal and independent vis-à-vis each other, even if subject to Danish rule.

As for the militant sense of nationalism, it is important to remember that Iceland did not gain full independence from Denmark until World War II and that almost immediately after the war the United States began to exert a direct influence on the islands as the result of the establishment of a series of military bases there. Such experiences have tended to make many Icelanders strongly opposed to foreign influence *per se*. Their feelings have been enhanced by the fact that throughout the post-World War II period Iceland has been engaged in a continuous feud with Great Britain over access to the rich fishing areas around the islands.

Communist Policies and Their Results

The Icelandic Communists have exploited these factors quite effectively. Marxist doctrine has a natural appeal in an egalitarian culture, and the Communists have used the protest elements of the ideology to evoke a strong response from those who have traditionally questioned the existing social structure. With perceptive understanding of the individualistic spirit so prevalent among the people, the

[42] Erik Allardt, "Social Sources of Finnish Communism," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (Leiden), No. 1, 1964; J.H. Hodgson, *Communism in Finland*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] *Ibid.*

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Party leaders and members of parliament meet to discuss formation of a coalition government for Iceland in June 1971 after national elections. Third from the right is Ragnar Arnalds, Chairman of the Icelandic People's Alliance, and at the head of the table is Olafur Johannesson, Chairman of the Progressive Party, who emerged as Prime Minister of a coalition government which included two ministers from the People's Alliance.

—Wide World.

Communists have always played down the collectivist elements of their own faith: nevertheless, recognizing that most of the country's economic activities originally began as branches of Danish state monopolies, long before the advent of an organized labor movement, and that broad sectors of the population seem to take state ownership for granted, they have pushed for state ownership of much of industry and of other major economic ventures. The Communists have also sought consistently to validate their nationalist credentials, and they have acquired a reputation as one of the most nationalistic political forces in the country.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Icelandic Communists' approach, however, has been a willingness to participate in coalitions with other parties. From its very inception in 1930, the Icelandic party has followed this course. In 1938, it even reorganized to include the left wing of the Social Democrats, adopting the name of the United People's Party—Socialist Party (*Sameiningarflokkur altydu—Sosialistaflokkurin,* or SA-SF). Though the SA-SF was dissolved in 1968, another party consisting of several groups but with the Communists as the dominant force was formed. This group took the name the People's Alliance (*Altydubandalagid,* or AB).[45]

In sharp contrast to the Danish and Norwegian Communist parties, the various Communist-dominated alliances in Iceland have substantial political accomplishments to their credit. During the 1944-47 and the 1956-58 periods, the SA-SF participated in national coalition governments. In the two parliamentary elections of 1963 and 1967, it received 16.0 percent and 17.6 percent, respectively, of the total vote and won 8 seats and 10 seats, respectively, in the 60-member parliament. The new coalition party, the AB, polled slightly more than 17 percent of the total vote in the 1971 parliamentary election, and in that year it entered into a coalition

[45] *Thjodviljinn* (Reykjavik), Nov. 5, 1968.

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government with the Progressive Party and the Organization of Liberals and Leftists (*Samtok Frjalslindra og Vinstra Manna,* or SFVM). The SFVM, incidentally, had split off from the former SA-SF in 1968, prompting the reorganization of the SA-SF as the AB.)[46]

Not only have the various Communist-led coalitions won considerable electoral support, but they have also done well on other fronts. For example, they have enjoyed a stable membership of 1,000-1,500 card-carrying members out of a total national population of about 200,000. Communist influence in the 35,000-man-strong trade union federation (*Altydusamband Islands* or ASI) was predominant until 1968. That year, Hannibal Valdimarsson, a non-Communist left-winger, captured control of the ASI and established his own party, the SFVM. However, the Icelandic Communists still have a good deal more influence in their local unions than any other Nordic Communist party except the Finnish party.[47]

No less important, the SA-SF and the AB have maintained a firm grip on the left-wing ideological movements. Consequently, political fragmentation on the left—so much a factor in Norway and Denmark—has been minimal in Iceland. Aside from the AB, the Left consists of the SFVM (already mentioned), a small pro-Soviet faction called the Organization of Icelandic Socialists (*Barattusamtok Sosialista,* or BS), and a recently-surfaced group with Maoist views known as the Communist Organization of Marxists-Leninists.[48]

Reasons for Successes

The explanation for these appreciable achievements is complex, but one can single out several key factors. First, the SA-SF and the AB have been pretty much in the mainstream of the political life of their country rather than on the fringes of it. For example, the Icelandic Communists have staked out a strong nationalistic position on a variety of issues of broad popular concern, such as the territorial fishing limit, the reduction of foreign bases on the islands, and the need to preserve Icelandic culture in the face of "Americanization" and the spread of other alien cultural phenomena. The

Ludvik Josefsson, Member of the People's Alliance and Iceland's Minister of Fisheries, at a July 17, 1972, press conference announcing the breakdown of Anglo-Icelandic talks concerning his country's extension of territorial fishing limits to 50 miles.

—Wide World.

stances of the SA-SF and the AB on these questions have been at least as nationalistic as the views expressed by any of the "bourgeois" parties.[49] Indeed, the Communists have some basis for referring to themselves as "the real nationalists" in the country, though they at the same time derive an added plus from their emphasis on the need for greater economic equality and social justice. In short, there is no widespread feeling in Iceland—as there has been in Norway and Denmark during most of the postwar period with respect to the NKP and the DKP—that the local Communists are in any way alien elements.

Second, the combination of the continuing presence of cleavages within Iceland's socioeconomic structure and of a highly nationalistic culture has

[46] *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1973,* p. 184.

[47] For a discussion of the Finnish party, see Hodgson, "Finnish Communism and Electoral Politics," *loc. cit.*

[48] *Visir* (Reykjavik), Aug. 9, 1972.

[49] This is especially clear in the case of the so-called "cod war" with Great Britain (over the limit of territorial seas and British fishing rights). The Icelandic Communists have been the most adamant proponents of a 50-mile limit, without concessions. For a discussion of this controversy, see the statement by the Icelandic Prime Minister, Olafur Johannesson, to the Nordic Council on Feb. 17, 1973, as reported in *Arbeiderbladet,* Feb. 19, 1973.

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enhanced the potential appeal of a nationalistic party with a radical bent. The Communist leaders, in turn, have shown themselves excedingly sensitive to this combination of considerations by tailoring their policies to take account of both of them.

Third—and directly related to the two previous factors—the SA-SF and the AB have stayed at arms length from the international Communist movement. In fact, perhaps no other Communist party in Western Europe has maintained such an isolationist position as the AB. It has not participated officially in international Communist conferences at either the global or the regional level, and on the few occasions that Icelandic "observers" have shown up at such meetings, the party leadership has later had to proffer extensive justifications not only to the rank and file but even to some of the party leaders.[50] Furthermore, the SA-SF and AB have consistently stressed the "national road" and have dismissed the idea of one center of international communism as intrinsically absurd.[51]

Prospects

Having surveyed the differing fortunes of the Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic parties in recent years and the reasons for these differences, let us briefly summarize the implications of our analysis for the future of the individual parties.

Political radicalism, as far as one can tell, is by no means dead or dying in the Nordic countries. Norway and Denmark have both experienced a significant rise in radical activity in recent years, and left-of-center forces continue to control a substantial portion of the electorate and the organized political party membership in Iceland.

Yet the health of the Communist parties in the three countries varies considerably. In Iceland, the local party has put together a combination of nationalism, radicalism, and unconcern over external debates (which the man-in-the-street regards as esoteric and of no importance) that augurs well for its ability to continue to play a prominent role on the local political scene. Perhaps the irony of the situation lies in the fact that this unique and strong left-wing movement maintains only a marginal relationship to the world Communist movement.

In Norway and Denmark, on the other hand, the prospects of the NKP and DKP appear dim. Both parties represent a peculiar form of conservatism. They persist in arguing for policies which other left-wingers have dismissed as "state capitalism." It is as if they are suspended between radicalism and revisionism, incapable of firmly and effectively embracing either. This situation ensures continued isolation. Moreover, even if the parties enter into organizational cooperation with others, their weakness seems to make amalgamation the most likely outcome of such a course.

It is true that many of the ideas that the two parties have always emphasized in their programs may have a brighter future. To be specific, some of their platforms may yet become important elements of political life in their respective countries if these models of welfare-state systems move, as appears to be happening, into an era of political instability, fragmentation, and polarization. Nonetheless, there are likely to be precious few card-carrying Communists around to enjoy such a development.

[50] An example of this isolationism is the resolution passed by the AB in October 1968 condemning existing contacts with the Soviet Union and many of the socialist states of Eastern Europe, and forbidding any association by AB members with those countries which had occupied Czechoslovakia. See *Morgunbladid* (Reykjavik), Oct. 8, 1968.

[51] See, *e.g.*, *Thjodviljinn*, Aug. 17, 1972. This article criticized not only events in Czechoslovakia in the post-1968 period but also developments in the Soviet Union and the split in the international Communist movement.

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Books

Communist States and International Law

By John N. Hazard

RICHARD J. ERICKSON: *International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and Customary International Law.* Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff, and Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972.
SHAO-CHUAN LENG and HUNGDAH CHIU: *Law in Chinese Foreign Policy: Communist China and Selected Problems of International Law.* Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972.
JEROME ALAN COHEN and HUNGDAH CHIU: *People's China and International Law: A Documentary Study.* 2 Vols. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1974.
MILAN ŠAHOVIĆ, Ed.: *Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation.* Belgrade, Institute of International Politics and Economics, and Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972.
G. I. TUNKIN: *Theory of International Law.* Translation and Introduction by William E. Butler. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974.

THE COINCIDENCE of Soviet and US proposals at the 1974 Caracas conference on the law of the sea and again at the Geneva conference during the spring of 1975 has excited comment about the likelihood of a convergence of the positions of the two great powers —and, by extension, of Marxist and Western states—regarding the role of international law. The argument goes that as the Soviet Union has grown in stability at home and prestige abroad, it has become a power favoring preservation of the *status quo,* and hence one for whom international law—as a means of preserving the *status quo*—has become a useful instrument of foreign policy. The USSR, no less than the United States, wants its naval vessels to traverse narrow straits without hindrance, and its fishing and merchant fleets to sail the high seas as freely as their counterparts under foreign flags.

Moscow's stance at Caracas and Geneva is but another example of an ever-evolving Soviet position. It is a long time since the earliest Soviet leaders denounced international law as a weapon of the bourgeoisie. Since the USSR entered the League of Nations in 1934, utilization of international law rather than its denunciation has become Soviet policy. By its entrance into the United Nations as a charter member after World War II, the Soviet Union demonstrated that international law had become a major instrument of its policy, and it has expanded the training of skilled lawyers to participate in international diplomacy and international trade.

This development has naturally attracted the attention of scholars in both the Marxist and non-Marxist worlds. Marxist authors attempt to define current Soviet policy and to place it within a framework which will continue to attract the support of leaders in the Third World. Non-Marxist authors attempt to assess the writings and actions of Marxists to determine to what extent the disrupting influence of the Communists noted during the early years has faded from the scene.

The books under review fall within these parameters. The Soviet and Yugoslav authors attempt to explain what they mean by espousing a law of peaceful coexistence as general international law. The non-Marxists attempt to evaluate the practice of the USSR and the People's Republic of China to determine whether it shows sufficient stability of policy and acceptance of longstanding

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international legal principles to merit including such states among those which can be expected to adhere more often than not to traditional legal norms.

Of course, all of the authors are sophisticated enough to recognize that no state, whether Marxist or non-Marxist in orientation, considers itself bound in every detail by what is called international law. Indeed, much of international legal doctrine has been in dispute during recent decades as the West European states which were its original formulators have lost their worldwide hegemony. Today, it is the bold author who claims to know with certainty just what norms constitute international law.

Every legal specialist also knows that statesmen of every country from time to time ignore the rules that are called law when they think national survival is threatened—and sometimes they ignore the rules when much less than survival is at stake. In short, international law is often regarded by world leaders as no more than an instrument of politics. Cynics claim that foreign ministers say to their legal advisers, "Tell me not what I cannot do, but how I can do what I want to do and maintain the image of one who is acting within the law." To the informed analyst, the existence in fact of a violation of international law is frequently self-evident. Such being the case, the decisive question in assessing conformance to international law is not whether a certain state is in violation of the law, but how often this occurs and how serious the violations are.

Students of power politics often suggest that rules of international law are recognized and respected primarily when practice requires such recognition in order to make international intercourse possible. Thus, foreign diplomats must be protected in their activities if one's own diplomats abroad are not to be harassed, insulted, kidnaped, and murdered. Citizens of foreign states must be accorded fair trial if one's own citizens abroad are to receive similar protection from host states. The property of foreigners must be respected if further investments of funds are to be sought successfully from capital-rich nations. Brief consideration of these facts indicates that national self-interest becomes a major sanction of international law so long as states feel interdependent. The golden rule must be observed unless a state is so isolated as to have no interests abroad to protect.

IN PROBING the degree of Soviet conformity to international legal norms, Richard J. Erickson focuses particularly on the area of customary international law, because it is here that Soviet authors have been most inclined to accept or reject established Western norms as Soviet circumstances have dictated. The author points out that for decades Soviet diplomats have questioned custom as a desirable source of law because they viewed its evolution as closely tied to private enterprise and colonialism: they have tended to see custom as something tarred with a capitalist and imperialist brush. To protect themselves against what has seemed to be a hostile world, Soviet legal scholars have argued instead that the primary source of international law is the treaty, since it represents a conscious effort to reach a meeting of the minds and to create law. A state that signs a treaty indicates its conclusion that the law embodied in the treaty is beneficial to the signatory's interests.

Despite these Soviet predilections, Erickson's studies lead him to conclude that in the main Soviet international policy today relies heavily on established custom in its implementation. He feels that Western diplomats and

Reviewers in This Issue

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ALFRED ERICH SENN—Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin (Madison); author of *The Russian Revolution in Switzerland, 1914-1917*, 1971, a study of Tsarist political émigrés in Switzerland during World War I.

ROLAND SCHÖNFELD—head of the export-import division of a family business in Regensburg, German Federal Republic; lecturer and author on economic history and foreign trade policy, with contributions appearing in *Osteuropa, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, and *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte.*

STEPHEN R. SACKS—Assistant Professor of Economics, The University of Connecticut (Storrs); author of *Entry of New Competitors in Yugoslav Market Socialism*, 1973.

K. C. YEH—Senior Economist, The Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, California); coauthor of *Economy of the Chinese Mainland*, 1965, and contributor to *The American Economic Review.*

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scholars have too often overlooked developments along this line and wrongfully concentrate on the Soviet practice of earlier years when there was, indeed, a revolutionary rejection of customary rules perceived at the time to be inimical to Soviet needs and aspirations. For Erickson, the contemporary conservative trends outweigh the revolutionary ones. The Soviet arguments at Caracas and Geneva would seem to bear out his point, at least so far as Moscow's attitudes on the law of the sea are concerned.

THE SAME PROBLEM of measuring the extent of acceptance or rejection of international law is posed by the volume on Chinese Communist attitudes edited by Shao-Chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu. They and their contributors find writers on international law in the People's Republic to be at a stage of development comparable in considerable measure to that of their Soviet counterparts of the 1920's before the USSR joined the League of Nations. The Chinese still see the world as hostile, and they feel that they must comb international legal norms thoroughly to find the perils lurking there before accepting any part of them. Consequently, like their Soviet predecessors, they prefer the treaty to custom as a source of law because it can be controlled. At the same time, as a nation which has had a long history of treaties imposed on it in humiliating fashion by the Western world, the Chinese can be expected to argue that not all treaties, but only those that are agreements reached by equals, make good law.

In the 1970's, however, Chinese attitudes toward international law are changing, too. The People's Republic has become a member of the United Nations; its embassies circle the globe; its diplomats attend many conferences. It plays host to the merchants of the world, and its own ships ply the seven seas. The PRC has been catapulted into the international arena within a very brief period after its emergence, and what this means in terms of the Chinese view of international law is a question of the first order. After perusing a Chinese literature on the subject that they admit to be far less rich than the corresponding body of Soviet writing, Professors Leng and Chiu conclude that Chinese diplomats have shown themselves more dogmatic in applying Marxist-Leninist theory to international law and less responsive to recent international legal developments in the Western world than their Soviet counterparts.

Generally speaking, the authors find Chinese writings on international law more belligerent in tone than Soviet writings—a fact which they attribute to the greater revolutionary belligerence of Chinese international policy. In spite of Peking's recent moves to find a temporary *modus vivendi* with the West, Chinese authors still write of the perils of "American imperialism" and of an eventual resort to armed force to overthrow the imperialist West. Such as it is, the Chinese literature shows more of an effort to discredit international law than to reshape it in a Marxist image, thus presenting a sharp contrast to current tendencies in the latter direction in the USSR and Eastern Europe, as we shall see presently.

But while the Leng-Chiu volume makes this point quite clear, it nevertheless shows that the Chinese do accept established international law on some issues where it appears in their interest to do so. An example is provided by Dr. Tao Cheng's article on Chinese positions relating to the law of the sea, which has until recently been essentially customary law. Dr. Cheng concludes that the practice of the PRC reflects two factors: first, the international tension over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu; and second, a desire to exploit the oceans and their resources in spite of limited capacity to do so. Thus, while the People's Republic tries to keep ships of foreign powers a safe distance from its shores, it tries at the same time to protect the possibilities for expansion of the activities of its own merchant and fishing fleets by placing limits on how far other states extend their territorial seas. These objectives have received concrete expression in two forms: (1) formal extension of the traditional three-mile territorial limit to twelve miles, with maximum extension of the base line from which the territorial limit is measured; and (2) espousal of the doctrine of freedom of the seas beyond the territorial belt.

A similar trend may be observed in Chinese attitudes concerning diplomatic privileges and immunities. The PRC has not become a party to the Vienna conventions on the subject, but according to the paper by John Chung Kuan and George Po-Chung Chen, it claims the customary privileges and immunities for its representatives and agents abroad and reciprocally extends them to foreign diplomats accredited to the PRC, although details have still to be spelled out.

The two very large volumes edited by Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu serve as supporting evidence for the volume by

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Leng and Chiu. The editors have assembled and reproduced pertinent documents in English translation in order to help outsiders judge for themselves what the People's Republic's attitudes toward international law are. The editors' own conclusion is suggested in the preface, where they state their purpose to be to clarify the extent to which China pays lip service to international law. By the very use of the term "lip service," they raise the basic question of whether the printed word can be accepted as a guide to Chinese action, or whether it is designed only to calm the apprehensive foreigner while some subversive activity is conducted out of sight.

INDEED, there is good reason today for foreigners attempting to fathom the extent of the Marxist commitment to international law to be wary. The rough road traversed over many years dictates caution in accepting Communist doctrinal expositions. In the Soviet case, the experience of the early years of the Bolshevik regime gave cause to expect an attempt to undermine the world legal system. Revolutionary fervor was the order of the day, and the Bolshevik leadership expected the influence of its own revolution to spread quickly. The Third International was established by Lenin in 1919 to mastermind the expansion of the revolution. Soviet agents roamed the world, and fledgling revolutionary movements received technical and material help from the Bolsheviks of the new Soviet Russia. At some point, however, Soviet revolutionary ardor entered an apparent decline. Historians may vary in their choice of the exact turning point. Was it the repudiation of Trotsky's opposition to Brest-Litovsk and of his slogan, "No war, no peace"? The withdrawal of Soviet advisers from China in 1927? Soviet entry into the League of Nations in 1934? Moscow's formal recognition of the universal destructiveness of the atomic bomb in 1961? Or some other event? Whatever the answer, the fact is that the emphasis upon world revolution has been softened and a new policy of "peaceful coexistence" officially proclaimed. The Soviet authorities have declared this policy to be the inspiration for the further development of international law. The question is, however: What do Soviet legalists mean when they speak of an international law based on "peaceful coexistence"?

The content of the new policy and of what Soviet experts term "the law of peaceful coexistence" has been accorded considerable attention in the Marxist and non-Marxist worlds alike. Marxist authors present the policy as coupling the preservation of peace with the continuation of ideological struggle between the Marxist and non-Marxist worlds. As such, it has been resisted by Western authors ever since it was brought to the fore in the mid-1950's, because it seemed to them to be a catchword for a new venture to direct the development of international law into uncharted fields. The shape of future international legal norms has been debated and studied both in nongovernmental forums such as the International Law Association and in the United Nations itself.

In seeking support for their effort to create a new law of peaceful coexistence to replace the traditional norms of international law, Soviet diplomats have made a particular effort to play upon the sentiments of the former colonial peoples. The most frequently discussed plank of their platform has been the elimination of all vestiges of colonialism from international law. By this, they mean not only introducing "national liberation" as a primary aim of the law but also making the maintenance of colonial situations an international crime subject to sanctions and authorizing third countries to give active aid to colonial peoples struggling against their governments.

MILAN ŠAHOVIĆ'S volume is a useful though not impartial source of information on this as well as other aspects of the effort of the Communist states to introduce a new law of peaceful coexistence. The authors, all Yugoslavs, naturally support the principle of peaceful coexistence which their government has declared to be the foundation of its foreign policy. They couple their support with sharp criticism of the West, but despite the polemic they help the reader to understand what Marxists have in mind. The book takes the form of a commentary on the provisions of the "Declaration of Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States," adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on October 24, 1970,[1] as a statement of principles governing the conduct of states under the UN Charter. Most Western

[1] For the text, see Resolution 2625 (xxv), adopted without vote and published in *Yearbook of the United Nations 1970*, New York, 1972, pp. 789-92; in *American Journal of International Law*, (Washington, DC), Vol. 65, 1971, pp. 243-51; and in Šahović, pp. 436-43. The seven principles established by the Declaration were: no use of force; peaceful settlement of disputes; no intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction; cooperation as a duty; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; sovereign equality of states; fulfillment in good faith of obligations.

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powers accepted the Declaration; but they did so with misgivings, especially regarding the principle of self-determination of peoples.[2] Few Westerners, of course, now espouse colonialism; so that issue was not the cause of Western hesitation. Rather it was the fact that some Western delegates saw the Declaration as a possible first step toward a radical revision of the whole body of international law on intervention, and not just the rules relating to colonialism. Many in the West felt that such a wide-ranging revision of international law would undermine stability at a time when it was needed to preserve the fabric of relative peace.

Dr. Tomislav Mitrović's contribution to the Sahovic volume illustrates where the sticking point for the West lies, namely, self-determination of peoples. Mitrovíc emphasizes that the 1970 Declaration means that the now widely accepted principle of the right of self-determination of *states* is also applicable to *peoples*. This interpretation recalls the contention of Soviet legal scholars in the early 1920's that persons in international law might be other than states—that such persons could and should include the proletarian masses scattered throughout the non-Communist states whenever they could be organizationally identified, as for example when organized in labor unions. This view—which was rejected by Western advocates of traditional international law—was abandoned as the Bolsheviks' early revolutionary fervor waned and the Soviet Union began seeing itself as a state dealing with other states. What concerns the West today is that there may be emerging a reassertion of the old claim in a slightly different formulation.

Acceptance of the doctrine that peoples as well as states are persons in international law could have far-reaching ramifications. Might it not be argued, for example, that a people denied the right to influence its own destiny can claim a right in international law to seek assistance from outside states in overthrowing not just a colonial but even a non-colonial government, and by extension that third states may legally intervene in what in the past would have been considered the domestic affairs of another state to render such assistance? President Sukarno of Indonesia earlier provided an example of how this doctrine might operate when he repeatedly argued the legality of landing troops in Malaysia on the ground that he was responding to a desire on the part of the Malays to be free of what he called a "neocolonial" government violating the rights of its people. (Upon his ouster, his successors repudiated this claim.)

IN SHORT, the issue is not whether colonialism may lawfully be opposed, but whether the doctrine of self-determination should be extended to give the right to citizens to oppose their own governments, whether colonial or non-colonial, on the ground that those governments are not representative. And if such a right were recognized, should it be extended further to legalize intervention by an outside state on behalf of citizens exercising that right? The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation, in affirming the doctrine of self-determination, sets no limits on it. The statement draws no line between the ouster of a colonial government and one that is not colonial, *i.e.*, one not conducted by a distant metropole inhabited by people of a different race. The Declaration only hints at a distinction in stating that the right of self-determination of peoples is not to be recognized in law if the government concerned represents the whole people belonging to a territory without distinction as to race, creed, and color. In other words, the Declaration does not constitute a legalization of revolution within a state where Chinese govern Chinese or Spaniards govern Spaniards, even though cultures may differ greatly among the peoples inhabiting the area governed by the state apparatus.

The Declaration does seem to support the right of peoples to request aid in overthrowing a government led by one race and pursuing a policy of apartheid in order to prevent another race from sharing in that government. On the other hand, by its silence on the subject, the Declaration leaves in an undefined area aid given to a people forced to live under a policy discriminating on some other basis, such as wealth, occupation, education, or culture. There has been no test of the racial hypothesis to date, but in 1974 sentiment emerged within the United Nations against seating the delegates of the South African government as unrepresentative because of its apartheid policy. In suspending the Pretoria delegation from the 1974 General Assembly, the majority, supported by the Marxist states,

[2] The adviser for legal affairs to the United States Mission to the United Nations has reviewed opinions expressed in preparation of the Declaration. See Robert Rosenstock, "The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 65, 1971, p. 713.

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seemed to be adopting a policy comparable to one interpretation of the law of "recognition" as between governments in bilateral relationships: *i.e.*, it asserted the right to decide whether a government was representative of its people or not.[3] As in the case of colonialism, few would support a government fostering apartheid, but more than a few could well fear the disruptive potential of an extension of international law to create a right in the United Nations to reject delegates from states whose governments might be unpopular for other reasons—*e.g.*, for suspending elections, offering only a single candidate on an electoral ballot, or prohibiting freedom of association except in a single political party. Some might seek rejection of delegates chosen under the leadership of a "vanguard party," while others, from states ruled by a "vanguard party," might demand rejection of those chosen under voting procedures which they consider productive of no more than "mathematical majorities." Such majorities, the latter maintain, are unrelated to the real interests of the people and do not authentically express the popular will; hence the vanguard must be the "trustee" of the will of the people until the people come of age intellectually.

IT IS NO WONDER, then, that legal scholars in the traditional democracies raise questions about the possible dangers inherent in the effort to effect a radical revision of established international legal norms. They are fearful that supporters of the vanguard concept of political leadership could seek to revise international law in such a way as to authorize support for a minority revolting against the will of a majority expressed at the polling booth, or to legalize intervention by a foreign state to protect a people against its own government if, in the eye of the intervening state, that government had fallen prey to the blandishments of foreign powers regarded as hostile to the intervener. Although the latter argument has already been used to justify outside intervention to oust governments in both hemispheres, many scholars would prefer that the law continue to uphold the traditional ways of determining the will of a people.

The Yugoslav scholars writing in Sahović's book, while endorsing the principle that the peoples of the world have the right of self-determination and that foreign states have the right to intervene to aid them in exercising that right, show some doubt about supporting such a doctrine without qualifications. From their first acceptance of the policy of peaceful coexistence, the Yugoslavs have demanded that it be denominated an "active" policy, by which they mean that it must apply to relations among the Marxist states themselves as well as to relations between Marxist and non-Marxist states. (The Chinese Communists have also argued that nothing should give the Soviet Union the right to intervene in China.) Soviet scholars have not shared this view. They have argued that relations among Marxist states should be on a higher level of proletarian or socialist internationalism, which is defined as far more fraternal in character than peaceful coexistence. Although ideological struggle is permitted between Marxist and non-Marxist states under the law of peaceful coexistence, it cannot—according to the Soviet line of reasoning—be extended to legalize a struggle between Communist parties, since there is only one "orthodox Communist movement," led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet legal authority, Gregory Tunkin, in his study, goes a step further when he argues that there is coming into being between Marxist states a new *socialist* international law which is more innovative than the law of peaceful coexistence. Tunkin states that this new law is being created in the treaties and practical interaction among Marxist states, and he finds it epitomized in the April 1969 communiqué of COMECON,[4] which spoke of the socialist internationalism of mutual aid, and in the principle followed by the Warsaw Pact powers in Czechoslovakia in 1968, under which socialist states were obligated to aid each other in overcoming threats from abroad.

If one puts together the views of Marxist legal scholars, particularly those of the Soviet Union, one can discern the emergence of a sort of theory of a three-stage progression in the development of law governing the relations between states: from traditional international law, through the "law of peaceful coexistence," to "socialist international law." The con-

[3] The suspension of South Africa from participation was by a ruling of the chair, occupied by the Algerian Foreign Minister. The ruling was upheld by the General Assembly 91 to 22. States in opposition were the United States, the United Kingdom, a number of West European states, and some Latin American states; 19 states abstained. The maneuver by the chair was adopted after failure in the Security Council of a motion for expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, a motion vetoed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. These events are recounted in *The New York Times*, Oct. 21 and Nov. 13, 1974.

[4] The text in Russian appears in *Pravda* (Moscow), April 27, 1969, p. 1.

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crete nature of the new elements is being made specific daily in the diplomatic activity of the Marxist states, often in supporting the aspirations of the Third World. The most recent manifestation of expansion of the "law of peaceful coexistence" was a UN resolution of May 1974,[5] adopted at a special session called at the instigation of Algeria to consider the raw materials crisis stimulated by the oil producers. While reiterating recognition of the right of self-determination contained in the 1970 Declaration, the 1974 resolution goes further. It asks for recognition of the right of states, territories, and peoples which are under foreign occupation, alien colonial domination, or a government practicing apartheid to receive restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, natural and other resources of the subject states, territories, and peoples.[6]

Restitution has been mooted for some years in the corridors of international conferences and in books authored by scholars in the developing world. Now it has been formally stated in a UN resolution as a principle accepted by a majority of the states of the world. Moreover, it has been supplemented by an assertion of the legality of outside assistance to developing countries, peoples, and territories seeking to rid themselves of infringements on the exercise of their sovereign rights arising from economic, political, or any other type of coercive measure or from neocolonialism in all its forms.[7]

Clearly, international legal norms are undergoing a radical revision the end of which no one can yet see, although the outlines are beginning to emerge. For those who wish to gain an idea of how Marxist legal specialists view this process, the books under review provide an excellent mini-library. By bringing together a rich selection from the mass of literature appearing in the field, they permit the reader to formulate his or her own views of what is happening.

WHAT THEN are the prospects for a convergence of Marxist and Western views on international law? They appear good when law reflects interests shared by a number of countries in both ideological camps, as in the case of the law of the sea or the law of diplomatic intercourse. They are more problematic when it comes to the attempts of Marxist states to revise international law in the direction of creating what might be called an "opening on the left." These governments, in emphasizing a legally-protected right of self-determination of peoples, find support from the United States and many other Western governments as long as the target is colonialism. What is disturbing to the latter governments, however, is the further suggestion to legalize movements aimed at overthrowing established governments of other stripes.

It is already clear that many states regard governments applying policies of apartheid as being analogous to colonial governments and hence illegal: racist regimes are said to be maintaining a form of internal colonialism. But the trend in the new direction does not stop there. One finds evidence to suggest that "neocolonialism" is considered illegal as well and that third persons (outside states) are deemed to be legally justified in intervening to help revolutionary groups overthrow a government that manifests such tendencies. The disturbing feature about this position is that no clear definition of what constitutes "neocolonialism" is offered. If Malaysia's experience with Sukarno is any indication, a government might be attacked as "neocolonial" if it relied heavily for financing and technical aid upon its former metropole, as many post-colonial governments do.

Whether any of the Marxist governments will in fact claim the legality of revolution and outside aid to revolutionaries in a case where, in its view, there exists some form of domination and discrimination unrelated to race, creed, or color remains to be seen. Certainly, among themselves, Marxist governments already insist, in principle, upon strict adherence to standards established by general meetings of the Communist parties of the world. If the government and Communist party of a Marxist state discard enough of the fundamental principles established as necessary to the preservation of an acceptable socialist system and thereby cause neighboring Marxist governments and parties to fear the revival of some form of

[5] "Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order," UN Resolution 3201 (S-vii), May 1, 1974, adopted without vote. For the text, see *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 68, 1974. pp. 798-801. US reservations concerning the Declaration, as made by Ambassador John Scali to the General Assembly and published in *ibid.*, p. 731, concerned, among other matters, its failure to mention the duty to pay prompt and adequate compensation in cases of the nationalization of property, the absence in it of a general denunciation of the exercise of economic pressure, and its espousal of the principle of restitution.

[6] Art. 4 (f).

[7] Art. 4 (i).

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non-Marxist influence, intervention will be countenanced as legal. This has become a fixed rule of the new socialist international law as propounded by the Soviet Union and its allies.

Beyond these new principles governing political relationships, others are emerging in the economic field. The concept of making restitution to former colonial peoples for pillaged resources is such a principle. Since no Marxist government has presided over a colony as defined in United Nations practice (unless the German Democratic Republic were to be assessed a share of Imperial Germany's debt for exploitation of her colonial empire), no Marxist government will receive a bill. Only the still-surviving former colonial powers will receive demands for payment. Having nothing to lose and much to gain, the Marxist governments can be expected to join those states which were once colonies in pressing this proposition before the forums of the world, and the question may well become a major divisive issue in the further development of a new international law.

The KGB's Broadening Horizons

By Harry Rositzke

JOHN BARRON: *KGB—The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents.* New York, Reader's Digest Press, 1974.
LADISLAV BITTMAN: *The Deception Game. Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare.* Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Research Corp., 1972.

THE PARAMOUNT function of the USSR's Committee of State Security (KGB—*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti)* has been and continues to be the maintenance of the Communist Party's control over Soviet society. Through its Second and Fifth Chief Directorates, the KGB has served as a stable and indispensable element of the official control system, assigned to counteract all potential troublemakers ranging from intellectual dissidents and dissatisfied Jews to hostile members of other ethnic minorities and restless workers. However, through its First Chief Directorate (the Foreign Directorate), the KGB also carries out an important range of secret operations abroad. It is this aspect of KGB activities which is the focus of the books under review and of the present discussion.

While the domestic operations of the KGB have remained essentially unchanged, there have been radical changes in both the scope and content of its overeas operations in the past 15 years. First, as Khrushchev extended the range of Soviet interests to include the Third World and the rapidly expanding number of post-colonial states, the KGB was forced to "go global," placing heavy recruiting and training strains on the KGB's Foreign Directorate, which for the previous decade had been able to concentrate on Europe. At the same time, and perhaps as a result of mounting manpower needs elsewhere, the organization turned increasingly to the use of "illegals" (*i.e.,* Soviet intelligence officers operating clandestinely under the cover of private citizenship) in the US and Western Europe, even though the number of KGB representatives under regular diplomatic cover did continue to grow steadily in Rome, Bonn, Paris, London, and New York. A second factor affecting KGB operations was the emergence, in the early 1960's, of a new "main enemy"—the People's Republic of China. The PRC became both an espionage target and, perhaps more important, a competitor with the Soviet Union during the mid-1960's for political influence in the world Communist movement. Moreover, as the protagonists of capitalism and communism groped toward an uneasy *modus vivendi* called "peaceful coexistence," the more traditional intelligence aspects of KGB work began to recede before an increasing emphasis on political action.

While it is this political-action facet of KGB work to which we shall devote major attention, one cannot ignore the continuing "bread-and-butter" operations of

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espionage and penetration of Western intelligence services which have occupied the KGB and its associated sister services in Eastern Europe and Cuba. The main target of these activities has been the power establishment of the United States and its allies, with an eye to acquiring important military as well as industrial-technological secrets. Soviet requirements for conventional military intelligence may have diminished in light of a growing Soviet capacity for overhead photography and electronic surveillance, but the networks of agents of the KGB and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU—*Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie)* of the Soviet Armed Forces are still heavily devoted to penetrating the foreign offices and general staffs of the Western powers. The exposure of Soviet spies in London, Bonn, and Paris, and in NATO organizations, in recent years attests to the persistence, if not to the full scope, of the Soviet effort. While there is no evidence to suggest that the KGB has yet penetrated the power bureaucracies in Washington, its effort to "get into" the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency is unremitting. There are several hundred KGB and GRU officers stationed in New York and Washington. Moreover, the effort is not restricted to activities on American soil. Each year several hundred American officials abroad, from code clerks to foreign service officers, are approached by socially active Soviet intelligence officers with tempting inducements to "cooperate."

On these routine matters of espionage and counterespionage, Barron's book is a highly useful compilation. He has assiduously collected material from open sources, from interviews with Soviet defectors, and from Western intelligence services including the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. He provides a brief history of the KGB, the organizational breakdown of the KGB and other Soviet intelligence services, a long list of "Soviet citizens engaged in clandestine operations" (most of them staff officers under diplomatic cover), and the next of an interesting "top-secret" KGB document on "The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the USA and Third Countries."

Barron's narrative, interspersing true spy stories with analysis or comments on the organization of the KGB, makes for easy and sometimes exciting reading. We learn of the seduction of a French ambassador by a Soviet agent, the adventures of a Mata Hari working for the Cubans, the penetration of the "impenetrable" vaults of the US Armed Forces Courier Center at Orly airport, the life and adventures of a Soviet "illegal" operating in the US, and even the career of a Soviet official who was actually working for the CIA. While no one can hope to write a fully current history of the KGB, this careful presentation of a miscellany of specific cases from the 1950's and 1960's serves to illustrate only too convincingly the patience, care, and money the KGB will expend on key targets.

WHILE THE KGB has continued its efforts to capture enemy secrets and to infiltrate opposing intelligence operations, it has—in today's world of trade and negotiation, of multipolar diplomacy—also become increasingly valuable as a political instrument of the Soviet state. "Political" is, of course a broad term, and even the successful recruitment of agents such as Kim Philby in the British Intelligence Service or Heinz Felfe in the West German service can serve political purposes and not just the mere accumulation of secret data. (Even more political was the work of the agent, Günter Guillaume, who became a personal assistant to former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.) But, under the policy of "peaceful coexistence," the KGB has come to perform a number of other, more explicitly political functions.

Take, for example, Moscow's broad effort to win friends and influence people in both the capitalist and developing worlds. Parallel with such official measures as military and economic aid programs, official propaganda, and the grant of scholarships for study in the USSR, more quiet work has been carried on by the KGB with leftist and rightist politicians and labor leaders, government officials and bureaucrats, bankers and businessmen. The activist subversion of the 1950's has been gradually transformed into a program of persuasive conversion. In that middle stratum of "confidential" or informal relationships lying between normal diplomatic contacts and strictly clandestine levels of association, KGB officers have become a significant presence in many societies, both capitalist and developing. They are actively at work around the dinner tables of establishment figures in New York, in cosy lunches with professors and academic deans in Boston and Tokyo, in seminars and informal chats with politicians and labor leaders in Bonn, in visits to small bankers and provincial editors in countries from Italy to India. They spread the word—

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often circumspect, sometimes blatant—for the Soviet cause; they seek to be helpful to their hosts, occasionally taking the opportunity to caution them against the military-minded Americans and the profit-seeking capitalists.

Out of this vast system of personal contacts come prospects for more serious cultivation whether as spies or as "agents of influence." The latter can range from a friendly newspaper editor who happily accepts Soviet Embassy advertising to a European businessman on a monthly KGB salary acting as an intermediary in negotiating a truck factory contract, from a provincial legislator who is given a modest contribution for his election campaign to a cabinet minister who gets his cut out of a trade deal with the Soviet Union. Now that the Soviet Union is in business around the world, such KGB-generated influence can save Moscow both time and rubles.

ANOTHER FACET of KGB political action today is "disinformation," which is the subject of a whole chapter in the Barron volume. The author cites such examples of "the dissemination of false and provocative information" as Moscow's systematic effort to conceal Soviet housing difficulties and the use of forged documents designed to create Turkish hostility toward Americans. How this "deception game" was played by the KGB's allied service in Czechoslovakia is documented in great detail in the book by Ladislav Bittman. The author was a member of the Czech political intelligence service (the First Directorate of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior) in the period from 1954 to 1968, during the last four years of which he worked in Department Eight, a section specializing in projects in the field of disinformation.

The Deception Game sketches some of the objectives of Soviet-inspired disinformation campaigns: to isolate the US from its friends and allies, to break up the NATO partnership, to weaken the German Federal Republic. Many of the projects Bittman describes were designed to muddy or destroy American relations with Third World countries, to paint the US as the Great Conspirator. A series of forged documents "exposed" a Western plan to overthrow the government of Tanzania. "Operation Thomas Mann" was designed to expose a new (mythical) hard-line policy of Washington toward Latin America and CIA preparations for political coups in half a dozen countries. It involved counterfeiting a USIA press release, publication of a number of circulars by a non-existent committee, and forging letters written by FBI director J. Edgar Hoover (the Czech service had no samples of CIA stationery). Another anti-American campaign, this time in Indonesia, was a short-term success. A forged document passed to an Indonesian ambassador and the buildup of an innocent American film-importer as a sinister CIA master-agent impressed Sukarno, but this minor gain was more than offset by the unsuccessful Communist revolt of September 1965, perhaps the most spectacular debacle for Communist policy in the postwar period.

Beyond cultivating opinion and spreading false information, the KGB also resorts to more explicit political action, such as triggering demonstrations, strikes, or coups abroad. Such operations are enormously simplified by the availability of Soviet proxies in almost all foreign countries. These include not only local Communist parties receiving direct KGB subsidies, but also the broad range of confidential and secret contacts whom, as noted above, the KGB has cultivated among the Left in labor unions, the media, and the universities, and who can be called upon at any time to carry out specific tasks. It also has at its disposal the contacts developed by the East European and Cuban services. For example, the main political action work in Allende's Chile was carried out by the Cuban service, with the Soviet Embassy keeping its hands fairly clean. Covert political action as it is generated in Washington—a specifically American operation directly executed by overseas CIA stations—clearly runs far greater risk of exposure.

The KGB, then, is a most useful instrument of the Soviet government in advancing its interests abroad. Unfortunately, there is little merit in Barron's prescription for solving the "problem" posed by the KGB—to have its officers thrown out of all the Soviet embassies around the world. For one thing, this leaves unsolved the problem of illegal agents. For another, in today's political climate, such a prescription is more likely to be applied to the CIA.

More important, Barron tends to overestimate the significance of the KGB. One must disagree with his assertion that it is "the primary executor" of Soviet foreign policy and that "there can be no real détente until this massive KGB aggression stops." Whatever détente may mean in the complex world of capitalist-socialist rivalry, its substance will hardly be determined by such an organization, for the KGB—despite its secrecy and broad range of activities—remains only a servant of the Soviet Communist Party.

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An Intracontinental Forum?

By Alfred Erich Senn

V. E. MAKSIMOV, Ed.: *Kontinent: Literaturnyi, obshchestvenno-politicheskii i religioznyi zhurnal* (Continent: Literary, Social-Political and Religious Journal).

THE COUNTERCULTURE in American society has become so well-established that the name itself now seems outmoded; however, the counterculture in the Soviet Union is still in the process of defining itself. Zhores Medvedev has vividly portrayed its early development,[1] but in the 1970's, especially after the deportation of A. I. Solzhenitsyn and the emigration of other intellectuals, it has assumed an entirely new dimension. Solzhenitsyn's writings since his exile have aroused particularly heated debate; his statements have both dismayed some of his supporters in the West and provoked new critical comment from other Soviet dissidents.

Solzhenitsyn reportedly took the lead in the founding of the new journal, *Kontinent,* which with time will probably bring about a further development of diverse trends among Soviet émigrés and dissidents. Although Solzhenitsyn is officially listed as just a contributor, the chief editor of *Kontinent,* V. E. Maksimov, in an interview published by the Paris-based Polish journal *Kultura,*[2] claimed that he was in regular contact with Solzhenitsyn and that each issue of the journal would feature some previously unpublished piece by Solzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn is even said to have chosen the journal's name, which was meant to symbolize the desire to establish better communications between the western and the eastern halves of the European continent. However, Solzhenitsyn himself has not yet publicly defined his relationship to the journal.

According to Maksimov, *Kontinent* is to appear as a quarterly in Russian and in German, and as a semi-annual publication in Italian, English, and French. As much as one-third of the text in each language could be different. Maksimov hopes eventually to make the journal a monthly.

In its introductory statement to the first issue, *Kontinent's* editorial board asserted its determination to give free expression to the "united creative force of artistic literature and spiritual thought of Eastern Europe." The journal's program rests on four basic principles: religious idealism, anti-totalitarianism, democratism, and nonpartisanship. These principles, the editors declared, should be broad enough to unite "all anti-totalitarian forces of Eastern Europe in their dialogue with the West."

Three inaugural statements solicited from prominent personalities posed demanding tasks for the journal. Solzhenitsyn depicted it as the intellectual heir of Soviet *samizdat* and of the journal *Novyi Mir,* and he urged that it should also attract writers from the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union and assume the role of "the true voice of Eastern Europe." In a letter to Maksimov, on the other hand, Eugene Ionesco called for a new leftist, non-Marxist doctrine which would teach men to love themselves first so that they could better love their neighbors: "We do not love ourselves very much. To love another as oneself means to hate him." The third statement, dated September 1974, came from Andrei Sakharov, who spoke of the need to collect "as much factual information as possible about the socialist countries and about the whole world." The journal, he urged, should contribute to the formation of "philosophical, moral, and ethical values," so lacking in contemporary mankind. *Kontinent,* Sakharov concluded, must explain the phenomenon of the socialist countries, a phenom-

[1] Zhores Medvedev, *Ten Years After Ivan Denisovich,* New York, Knopf, 1973.

[2] Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski, "From 'Archipelago' to 'Kontinent'; A Talk with V. E. Maksimov," *Kultura* (Paris), No. 10/325, 1974, pp. 84-88.

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enon which cannot be comprehended simply "from the window of a tourist bus or from the official socialist press."

THE FIRST ISSUE of the journal featured an interview with Milovan Djilas and the memoirs of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, but for the reader interested in Soviet dissent, the contributions about and by Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Siniavsky held the greatest attraction. A Polish commentary on Solzhenitsyn's *Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union* took up the defense of that work from its critics.[3] The anonymous author objected to Solzhenitsyn's "demonizing the role of doctrine" in Soviet Russia, but he argued that Solzhenitsyn, while a Russian patriot, is not a Russian nationalist in the traditional sense of being an aggressive expansionist. Therefore, he concluded, Solzhenitsyn represents a type of Russian intellectual with whom a Pole should sympathize.

The promised piece by Solzhenitsyn turned out to be chapter 88 of *The First Circle,*[4] depicting a political lecture at the Mavrino *sharashka*. For a Western academic who has given required lectures to captive audiences, the scene conjures up all sorts of familiar images, but when contrasted to a "socialist realist" representation of a political lecture in the Soviet Union, the scene comes across very differently. Solzhenitsyn has here once again questioned the vitality of official Marxist doctrine in the USSR and its potential to inspire the people. More than any other scene in *The First Circle,* this chapter, which has no prisoners present, directly challenges the Soviet system's image of itself.

Siniavsky's essay, entitled "The Literary Process in Russia," explored the power of words in the minds both of the dissidents and of the government, and it analyzed the problems experienced by Soviet writers in conforming to and deviating from the norms of the society. Siniavsky described the task of the writer as that of challenging limits; he noted that even in the darkest days of Stalinist rule a few writers still expressed themselves freely, even if only in private and even though their manuscripts were not to be published for a generation.

Kontinent proclaims its desire to unite Soviet dissidents and to open communications between intellectuals of all lands. Even before its appearance, however, it had contributed to the further division of the dissidents. When questioned by *Kultura* as to whether such figures as Valery Chalidze and Zhores Medvedev had objected to the journal's religious bent, Maksimov asserted that the differences between these individuals and those associated with *Kontinent* lay in their respective views of the Soviet Union. According to Chalidze and Medvedev, he explained, the Soviet system needs only "certain corrections," while "in our view, nothing short of fundamental reforms will change the situation or remove the evil which is deeply embedded in the system itself."

New forces have also entered the arena. Novosti recently put out an anthology of Soviet criticisms of Solzhenitsyn. Published in English, the volume attacks Solzhenitsyn's personal life, his literary accomplishments, and his political views.[5]

Kontinent will have to define its course carefully. To enter into dialogue with intellectuals of other lands (Solzhenitsyn), to provide information about the socialist countries (Sakharov), and to formulate a new set of values for a non-Marxist left (Ionesco)—all at the same time—constitute a formidable charge. The editors of *Kontinent* make clear their admiration for *Kultura,* which in their words has been more than just an "émigré journal," but for *Kontinent* to serve the same function for Soviet intellectuals would at this time seem only a remote possibility.

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[3] First published as N. N. of Warsaw, "How I Understand Solzhenitsyn's Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union," *ibid.,* No. 7/322-8/323, 1974, pp. 3-20.

[4] This chapter was omitted in the published version of *The First Circle.*

[5] *The Last Circle,* n. p., Novosti. Although there is no designation of a place of publication in the volume, it carries a copyright mark.

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Regional Development: Planners' Dilemma

By Roland Schönfeld

GEORGE W. HOFFMAN: *Regional Development Strategy in Southeast Europe.* New York, Praeger, 1972.
KOSTA MIHAILOVIĆ: *Regional Development Experiences and Prospects in Eastern Europe.* The Hague, Mouton, 1972.

THERE HAS BEEN a striking tendency among developing economies, whether capitalist or socialist, to experience distinct regional disparities in levels of economic development regardless of how far they have advanced along the road of industrialization. This phenomenon naturally raises the question of whether the centralization of economic planning and decision-making power associated with socialist forms of government has enabled Communist societies to combat this persistent problem any more effectively than their capitalist counterparts. The two books under review are of particular interest for the light they shed on this intriguing question.

The stubborn persistence of regional disparities at all stages of the process of economic development is rooted in many factors. Political influences and historical patterns, uneven distribution of natural resources, and internal barriers to trade and factor flows all help to create situations where some parts of a given country lag or stagnate while others flourish. In addition, market forces evidently tend to accentuate regional differences rather than to bring about regional balance in national economies. Already existing industrial centers, since they offer a source of skilled manpower, a market for additional products, superior transportation facilities, and other advantages making for "external economies," become increasingly attractive to investment capital and entrepreneurs in search of optimal output/cost ratios. At the same time, higher incomes and the amenities of urban life attract labor from more backward regions, causing a constant deterioration of the age structure of the population in the latter areas and thereby further diminishing their potential for catching up.

In the absence of a suitable self-regulating mechanism, government intervention to help lagging regions is widely considered appropriate even in free-market economies. Numerous considerations spur governmental action to achieve more balanced growth. Increasing differences in income between different regions of the same country are seen as a source of social unrest and discontent. Not only are governments held responsible for the relative impoverishment of parts of the population, but they must also bear to an increasing extent the costs of deteriorating living conditions (pollution, noise, and crime) in swelling urban agglomerations. By contrast, a policy of increasing employment in areas with unused labor reserves can contribute to the well-being of the whole economy, and the benefits are likely to exceed by far the costs of government intervention. A backward agriculture can be stimulated by rising incomes and increased urbanization. Exploitation of hitherto idle mineral and energy reserves can create processing industries which will help raise total national output and lead to successful integration of the given region into the national economy.

Consequently, the policy question is not *whether* to intervene but *how* to intervene most effectively. In all cases, governmental action to provide an adequate infrastructure of roads, railroads, communications, schools, hospitals, and housing is a prerequisite for getting the development process going in lagging areas. After that, tax reductions, subsidies, and cheap credit facilities can be offered to attract private investment to such areas, but in some instances, direct state investment in industrial development may be necessary.

Whether such policies will succeed or not, however, depends on

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overcoming other problems as well. For instance, inherited social structures, ingrained living and working habits, and the traditional values and fatalistic mentality characteristic of rural communities are apt to hamper a cumulative development process in lagging areas. In the free economies, moreover, since the government cannot force enterprises in more advanced regions to invest in backward areas, much depends on whether or not such enterprises desire, or can be induced, to expand. Still another problem is that the establishment of a basic goods industry generally has only a minor effect on employment and incomes, unless labor-intensive processing industries are also brought into existence. Furthermore, enterprises from established industrial centers, when setting up branch factories in less developed regions, tend to bring in their own trained personnel and to "import" appliances and semimanufactures from outside, and newly employed local workers may often spend most of their increased incomes on goods produced outside of their region for lack of intraregional supplies, thus benefiting the already prosperous regions instead of intensifying growth in the backward area itself through "spread effects."

These and many other difficulties have contributed to the failure of regional development policies applied by governments throughout the Western world to produce more than meager results —the Italian Mezzogiorno providing one rather striking example. In light of this failure, one is prompted to examine the measures adopted in this field by the socialist countries in order to determine whether they have been able to register greater success in combating regional inequalities. Has centralization of planning and decision-making power made a difference? Has the abolition of private ownership of most means of production and the elimination of obsolete social structures created more favorable conditions for the efforts of lagging areas to catch up? Have backward regions received comparatively more attention and care under socialist regimes proclaiming equality as a main goal of development? In short, have socialist governments been more successful in integrating disparate parts of their respective countries than their predecessors?

FROM THEIR titles, the two books under review seem to promise some answers to these questions. Following upon quite a number of monographs, particularly by Polish and Yugoslav scholars, demonstrating a growing concern about the regional aspect of socialist development, these two studies attempt a survey and comparison of the experiences of various East and Southeast European economies—the first dealing with the Balkans and the second with all the countries of the area which turned socialist after World War II.

Inasmuch as the authors come from different political environments—George W. Hoffman is Professor of Geography at the University of Texas at Austin, and Kosta Mihailović is Director of the Serbian Institute of Economics in Belgrade—one might have expected an interesting confrontation of viewpoints; however, the two studies are rather different in focus. Professor Hoffman's volume is primarily a detailed introduction to the overall development strategies of the countries concerned. Regional policy *per se* is dealt with in the third and last part of the book, and only the very last few pages are devoted to a comparison of differing approaches to regional planning. (Greater attention to this aspect of the subject would have been particularly interesting since the Hoffman volume covers one "capitalist" market economy, that of Greece, along with various socialist economies.) On the other hand, Professor Mihailović's study, prepared for the United Nations' Research Institute for Social Development, is an inquiry—complete with informative charts, maps, and statistics—specifically into regional development in socialist systems.

Although such fundamental aspects of Communist economic policy as socialization of the means of production and collective accumulation are not called into question, Mihailovic is quite critical not only of the common neglect of regional demands in most of the socialist systems examined, but even of the results hitherto achieved by his own country despite its relatively greater attentiveness to regional matters. An important factor contributing to this unhappy state of affairs, he notes, has been imitation of the Soviet example of economic development planning—"the only possible choice" open to the Communist parties that took over in Eastern Europe after World War II under the auspices of the Red Army. For the underdeveloped countries among them, this meant forced industrialization—with emphasis on heavy industry and a tremendous financial burden on a deliberately neglected agriculture. It also confronted East European socialist planners with the dilemma of reconciling the goal of maximum growth with another

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developmental objective—social equality and evenness in economic growth, which required a balanced development of regions. As in market economies, more impressive growth could be expected from the reconstruction and expansion of existing industrial facilities or from construction of new enterprises in developed areas where one could take advantage of the existing economic structure. Investments in lagging areas, by contrast, entailed long activation periods owing to the lack of a suitable infrastructure, of an industrial tradition, and of the necessary trained manpower and capable managers.

It should be noted, of course, that the location of manufacturing plants in Eastern Europe was already heavily polarized when the Communists took over, for the most part in the regions formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy and particularly around capital cities. However, Communist investment planning, by continuing to give priority to those regions, led to further concentration of production and population. Developed areas became relatively better off, and the income gap between these areas and predominantly rural regions widened. At the end of the 1960's, about half of Hungary's industrial production was concentrated around Budapest; eight out of Romania's 40 Romanian counties (*judete*) accounted for more than 50 percent of that country's total manufacturing output; and six out of Poland's 17 voivodships (provinces) and six out of Albania's 26 counties accounted for two-thirds of those countries' national manufacturing production. Although industrialization did spread to more and more regions, actual disparities remained large.

Not even the East European countries' hesitant experimentation with decentralization of economic decision-making has had a significant impact on regional imbalances. In most cases decentralization has amounted to nothing more than a modest shift of authority from branch ministries to newly-founded branch-wide trusts or to a few of the more important enterprises, and not to regional boards, thus leaving the emphasis in development planning on sectors of industry rather than regions. Moreover, the difficulty of arriving at objective calculations of profitability in a setting where prices have continued to be set more or less arbitrarily has compounded the general uncertainty surrounding governmental policies on investment allocations for regional development.

The problem is still further complicated by the fact that the unilateral articulation of local development needs by regional spokesmen has usually been viewed as symptomatic of disloyalty toward the state and the one-and-only party. Yet, as Mihailović points out (pp. 117 ff.), ethnic cleavages and the fear on the part of governments that tensions in this realm might be exacerbated by persisting development disparities have turned out to be powerful stimulants to more active regional development policies. This is evidenced by the far-reaching efforts of the Czechoslovak government to bring Slovak economic life up to the general national level (described in Mihailović, pp. 50 ff.).

Of all the East and Southeast European states, multinational Yugoslavia has gone farthest in the direction of giving attention to regional demands. According to Mihailović, the abolition of central planning and the delegation of considerable political authority to the constituent republics or even to communal bodies since 1965 have provided a somewhat better protection of local economic interests and coordination of sectors and branches on the regional level than exists in other, more centrally planned socialist economies. Yet even here, an integrated regional growth policy reconciling the development goals of the republics with those of Yugoslavia as a whole has never been elaborated. In 1969, almost 70 percent of Yugoslav industrial investment funds was allocated to Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia—areas where average per capita income was twice as high as in the underdeveloped regions of the country (in Kosovo the level was only one-fifth that in Slovenia). A federal Fund for the Development of Underdeveloped Regions created in the course of the reform has fallen far short of the expectations of the backward regions, having at its disposal less than 2 percent of the national product in the socialized sector. Nor has there been a satisfactory spontaneous export of capital from established centers of production into lagging regions. The result has been continuing conflict between the more advanced and less developed regions of the country over national investment priorities. G. W. Hoffman notes in his study that it was the Croatians' feeling of being exploited—a feeling shared by top local party circles—that led to the upheavals in that republic in late 1971.

In Professor Mihailović's view, the basic problem in Yugoslavia is that "regional interests are too pronounced. . . . Regional governments have become too powerful.

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. . . ." In fact, the shift of political power to the constituent republics in the late 1960's and early 1970's appears to have stimulated a wasteful quest for regional autarky, impeding integration of the national economy and generating needless duplication of investments.

In sum, one may conclude that the behavior of socialist countries in dealing with regional disparities has by no means been more exemplary than that of Western nations. In centrally planned economies, regional needs have tended to be arbitrarily disregarded for the sake of sustaining a maximum national growth rate. And in the "socialist market economy" of Yugoslavia, the concept of national development was apparently at least temporarily sacrificed to an exaggerated federalization. Although Mihailović recommends his book to "young experts from developing countries," such specialists, discovering more and more the importance of the agricultural sector in overall development (a theme that has been stressed by such scholars as I. Livingstone and D. Seers [1]), are likely to find the experience of socialist unbalanced growth quite disappointing.

[1] See, for example, I. Livingstone, "Agriculture versus Industry in Economic Development," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (London and New York), Vol. 6, No. 3, 1968; and D. Seers, "The Role of Industry in Development: Some Fallacies," *ibid.*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1963.

Yugoslav Market Socialism

By Stephen R. Sacks

RUDOLF BIĆANIĆ: *Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia.* Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1973.
ICHAK ADIZES: *Industrial Democracy Yugoslav Style.* New York, The Free Press, 1971.
BRANKO HORVAT. *Business Cycles in Yugoslavia.* White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, 1971.
M. J. BROEKMEYER, Ed.: *Yugoslav Workers' Selfmanagement.* Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1970.
MIODRAG SUKIJASOVIĆ: *Foreign Investment in Yugoslavia.* New York, Oceana Publications, Inc., 1970.

TWO OUTSTANDING features of the Yugoslav economy make it of special interest to economists. First, within a socialist institutional framework it utilizes a market mechanism to determine what shall be produced and to ensure efficiency in the production process. Second, it operates under the principle that participation in production is the sole basis upon which one acquires the right to make economic decisions. Although these features are also present to some extent in other countries, it is in Yugoslavia that market socialism and labor self-management are found in their most nearly pure form. The five books reviewed here are all devoted to describing the functioning of these and other aspects of the Yugoslav economic system. In addition to their interest for economists in general, they hold particular relevance for those countries attempting to incorporate or contemplating the incorporation of one or both of these major economic features.

When one looks at market socialism, one discovers that the operation of the market mechanism is attended by many of the same problems that are present in the capitalist setting. In particular, there are similar problems of inflation, unemployment, and instability. Branko Horvat's study, *Business Cycles in Yugoslavia,* dispels the widespread belief that there are no cycles in socialist economies. He uses four different mathematical models to demonstrate that various economic indicators in socialist economies do react to external shocks with oscillatory behavior. Horvat's empirical observations and conclusions concerning the Yugoslav economy are quite specific: he states that business cycles there

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last for three to four years and are most evident in underdeveloped regions and in the construction industry. He also states that since external shocks will certainly continue to occur, he can predict recurrent oscillations of the Yugoslav economy.

Faced with cyclical dislocations, the market socialist economy must repeatedly answer the question of how much government intervention is justified and desirable. The essence of the problem is to reduce the magnitude of the oscillations without reducing the effectiveness of the market mechanism in allocating resources and fostering technical efficiency.

A number of the authors reviewed here favor a minimum of intervention. In *Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia,* Rudolf Bičanić makes clear his belief that increased government intervention serves no economic purpose, but merely satisfies the hunger for power of federal bureaucrats. Similarly, Ichak Adizes, in this study of Yugoslav industrial democracy, argues that constantly changing government laws and regulations interfere with the ability of Yugoslav corporations to make rational business decisions. According to Adizes, the number of new federal laws defining the economic system adopted during the mid-1960's ranged from 718 to 982 per year. As a result, many firms have had to devote a substantial amount of time and labor simply to determining which alternative actions are legally open to them.

Horvat makes the strongest argument for greater reliance on an unfettered market mechanism, although he is, as we shall see, not in favor of a completely free market. "The real success of decentralization," he says, "depends on the degree to which administrative interventions are absent" (p. 170). His criticisms of *ad hoc* government reactions to economic problems (both in the form of new regulations and in the use of discretionary policy) and his faith in the ability of the market mechanism to make necessary adjustments make him sound very much like Milton Friedman. This is especially evident when he criticizes the bad timing of the Yugoslav government's use of monetary policies to restrain inflation. As elsewhere in his book, Horvat uses a rather sophisticated empirical technique to test and support his assertion: by comparing the number of government economic regulations issued each year with the peaks and troughs of the business cycle (using moving averages to remove seasonal fluctuations in lawmaking activity), he finds that "bad" years in terms of a low frequency of legislative intervention correspond to good years in the economy, and vice-versa. That is, he demonstrates a statistically significant inverse relationship between the number of legal regulations issued and the rate of growth of the economy. While the direction of causation is not indisputable, he makes a strong case for believing that government intervention worsens economic performance.

While Horvat places great faith in the market mechanism, he nevertheless recognizes that it is "inherently unstable and must therefore be directed." But, he adds, "that direction does not have to be administrative—in fact, administrative direction is the most primitive form of direction . . ." (p. 17). Unfortunately he does not deal with the question of what other forms of direction are possible, and his policy recommendations are therefore vague. He merely suggests the need for scientific study aimed at designing ways of handling an increasingly complex economy and, in particular, at developing a countercyclical investment policy.

The other authors are of no greater help in proposing solutions to the problem of regulating a market mechanism in order to avoid instability without simultaneously diminishing the efficiency of the mechanism. Mitja Kamusič, in an essay in M. J. Broekmeyer's *Yugoslav Workers' Selfmanagement,* claims that the trouble arises from the fact that Yugoslav economists "have not entirely grasped the regulative function of the economic instruments that the state has at its disposal, or have not been able to foresee the effects of particular economic and other measures . . ." (p. 105). Bičanić, it should be noted, does make a positive attempt to reconcile socialist planning with a free market by outlining a proposal for what he calls "polycentric planning." It is not, he says, a system without planning, but rather one in which "there are several central plans which differ in the agents involved, their targets, their size and policy instruments. . . . All decisions are . . . made consistent . . . by check and countercheck" (p. 46-47). He does not, however, specify the type of target or a means for reconciling conflicting plans.

TURNING FROM the operation of the market mechanism to the application of the principle of worker self-management in the Yugoslav economy, one discovers a similar picture of unresolved problems. There is the issue of deciding what sort of decisions

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are appropriate at what level in a self-managed enterprise and determining the extent of control that workers in a particular shop should have over a production decision which indirectly affects other workers in other shops. There is also the question of how much production efficiency is or should be sacrificed by expanding the participation of workers in decision-making. Moreover, as Najdan Pasić notes in a contribution to the Broekmeyer volume, there is in contemporary Yugoslav society a "limited readiness and ability of citizens to engage to the necessary extent in running the affairs of society" (p. 16). Finally, there have been in recent years developments in the Yugoslav economy directly violating the principle of self-management.

The five books at hand do furnish some good information on how the self-management system has been applied in Yugoslavia. Surprisingly, the Broekmeyer volume—the proceedings of a symposium on worker self-management held at Amsterdam in 1970—offers little in this regard save for the interesting paper by Emerik Blum, director of Energoinvest, who describes in very specific detail the management methods employed at this giant Yugoslav corporation. He tells us the number of delegates elected to various representative bodies, the specific decisions made by the enterprise council and workers' councils of sub-units, and the specific duties and authority reserved for the enterprise director. An equally explicit and concrete description of the organizational structure of corporate decision-making is provided in the book by Ichak Adizes, Associate Professor of Managerial Studies at UCLA. He places particular stress on the conflict which arises between worker participation in decision-making, on the one hand, and managerial efficiency and flexibility, on the other. His argument that workers' councils are usually too large and too unprofessional to make intelligent decisions implicitly calls for a more hierarchical, less democratic corporate structure, although he does not explicitly advocate such a development.

Yugoslavia's quest for economic efficiency has, in recent years, brought a threat to the self-management system from still another quarter. Specifically, inter-firm investment of capital—either by Yugoslav corporations or by foreign firms—has given people not participating in production the right to a voice in decision-making and to a share in profits.[1]

Miodrag Sukijasović provides us with considerable information about the procedures for management of joint Yugoslav-foreign ventures. He notes that there must be a joint operating board consisting of representatives of both partners, and that the respective numbers of representatives may be either equal or proportional to the amounts invested by each partner. The board makes most of the business decisions, but the workers' council of the Yugoslav partner may not delegate to its representatives on the board the authority to make certain very important decisions, *viz.*, those concerning founding a new enterprise, mergers, labor relations, and profit distribution. In some cases, rather elaborate procedures are set up for allocating responsibilities between the joint operating board and the workers' council of the Yugoslav firm.

In this study, which reads rather like a handbook for the potential foreign investor, Sukijasović claims that, despite appearances, there is no violation of the Yugoslav principles of worker self-management and social ownership of the means of production (p. 23). Unfortunately, he provides no argument to support this assertion. He does note that the foreign partner may not account for more than 49 percent of the total investment capital in a Yugoslav firm and that, in any case, it does not thereby acquire ownership of any part of the enterprise, though it may own certain of its assets. (There follows a rather interesting discussion of the fact that Yugoslav firms do not own assets, that society owns them, and that firms have only the right to *use* such assets.) Sukijasovic attributes the decision in 1967 to permit foreign investment not so much to a wish to attract outside capital as to a desire to have continued access to the latest technology. He also notes that contact with foreign partners is likely to improve the organizational efficiency of Yugoslav firms and help to train Yugoslav businessmen. He does not mention the risk that such exposure might lead toward more hierarchical corporate structures and hence away from worker participation.

A disturbing aspect of the Yugoslav discussions of the self-management system in the Broekmeyer volume is the absence of any concrete proposals to remedy the indicated problems. Thus, Pasić's only suggestion is:

The system of direct socialist

[1] I have examined in detail the ambiguous and contradictory Yugoslav laws relevant to the conflict between self-management and inter-firm investment in *Entry of New Competitors in Yugoslav Market Socialism*, Berkeley, Calif., Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973.

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democracy must merge the free, spontaneous and direct expression of various interests and demands with the deliberate guidance of social movement in line with certain socially agreed upon goals and values (Broekmeyer, p. 12).

Similarly, Mitja Kamusič (also in the Broekmeyer volume), recognizing that problems may be caused by the division of large corporations into small, quasi-independent units for purposes of worker self-management, suggests an analogy with the physicist's parallelogram of forces and claims that interests not diametrically opposite to one another can be reconciled in a resultant which satisfies all parties. However appropriate the analogy, it provides no concrete help in finding a method to achieve the necessary compromises between conflicting interests. This tendency of Yugoslav economists to approach such problems in a vague, abstract manner was criticized in a paper presented at the Amsterdam Symposium by the British economist Peter Wiles, who observed:

Great tension can be foreseen at this conference between the large generous and humane imprecisions characteristic of Yugoslav Marxism and the narrow, petty and technical quest for specific truths (in the plural) for which the Western economist is notorious. I wish to pretend to solidarize myself with the latter attitude, . . . and to put to my Yugoslav colleagues a large number of boring questions (p. 154).

Wiles then asked a series of excellent, very specific questions, some of which were answered in the discussion which followed (this exchange constituted the only really interesting discussion at the conference).

The extent to which Yugoslavia can come to grips with such "boring questions" concerning conflicts not only between managerial efficiency and self-management but between economic instability and the efficiency of the market mechanism in allocating resources and promoting technological progress will have an important bearing on the future evolution of other economies as well as of its own. If the Yugoslavs can develop tools to increase stability and allow for some social planning without interfering with the efficiency of the market, and if they can resolve the conflict between worker participation and managerial efficiency without resorting to hierarchical corporate decision-making, other countries will perhaps be encouraged to adopt similar systems.

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Assessing the Chinese Economy

By K. C. Yeh

US CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE: *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment—A Compendium of Papers.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972.
CHRISTOPHER HOWE: *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1910-1972.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1973.
ERIC AXILROD: *The Political Economy of the Chinese Revolution.* Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1972.

IN THE VIEW of Mao Tse-tung, economic growth is basically determined by two sets of factors: the relations of production and the productive forces.[1] The former term refers to systems of ownership of assets and distribution of output; the latter, to technology, capital, and human resources. Indeed, the history of the economic development of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1949 is a record of how the Chinese Communist leadership has striven to transform production relations and to increase productivity. The three books under review attempt to evaluate this process from three different angles and diverge markedly in substance, methodology, and style. The volume prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress (hereafter, JEC) is primarily concerned with productive forces. The study by Christopher Howe focuses on one major aspect of the production relationship: *i.e.*, wage patterns and wage policy. The book by Eric Axilrod examines the interaction of production relations and productive forces in the development of the Chinese economy, not just since Mao came to power, but from the beginning of the 19th century. Each of the studies thus makes its own distinctive contribution, and each has its own limitations.

The JEC study is a collection of ten papers on aggregate and sectoral growth performance, development policies, and technical factors underlying the economic trends. While not as voluminous as its predecessor,[2] it is no less substantial. Each of the ten papers is a major contribution, and together they form a volume that is by far the best available study on the current state of the Chinese economy.

In one sense, the Chinese development experience which these papers attempt to evaluate is unique. Starting in 1949 with a resource endowment and an economic heritage very much different from those of the Soviet Union at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the People's Republic nevertheless patterned its program of economic growth largely after the Soviet model of rapid industrialization through centralized, authoritarian planning. Therefore, any realistic assessment of the PRC's development experience must consider the important role played by the leadership in selecting development objectives and strategies. What were the key issues as perceived by the leadership? What decisions were made? Who made them and on what basis? What were the results? Were there any major errors? How did the results in turn affect decision-making in the next phase of development? The papers by Arthur G. Ashbrook and by Edwin F. Jones present excellent analyses of these questions. Ashbrook's study is particularly useful.

For all the unique aspects of the PRC's developmental record, the situation of the country in this regard has not been all that different from that of other developing countries. The PRC has faced many of the same fundamental problems that confront all developing lands, one of the most critical being the problem of

[1] Mao Tse-tung, "Notes on the Soviet Textbook of Political Economy," in *Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-suit* (Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought), 1969, p. 334. Mao believes that the relations of production are the more important of the two.

[2] *Cf.* US Congress, JEC, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1967.

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mobilizing resources for investment. In this respect, the question of China's food-population balance is crucial, for the magnitude of resources available for investment must depend on the extent to which output exceeds consumption (unless foreign assistance is available). The papers by Alva L. Erisman and John S. Aird are particularly relevant here, contributing much to our understanding of the PRC's dual strategies of agricultural development and population control. But achieving an agricultural surplus is only the first step. There is also the problem of converting the surplus into industrial capital. To accomplish this conversion, countries in the early stage of development that the PRC has been going through almost inevitably have to rely to some extent on foreign trade. Fortunately, John P. Hardt, who planned and organized the JEC study, was farsighted enough to include a comprehensive paper on China's foreign trade, written by A. H. Usack and R. E. Batsavage.

Another major development problem is the setting of priorities in resource allocation. It is clear that rapid industrialization has been a principal goal of Peking and that the industrial sector has received the bulk of investment. How fast has industrial production grown? Which industries have grown the fastest? What do we know for example, about the electronics industry, a key sector which not only is closely related to China's defense development but which also featured prominently in the controversy over industrialization strategy between Maoists and the group identified with Liu Shao-ch'i? Has transportation been a constraint on the PRC's industrial development? The contributions to the JEC study by Robert M. Field, by Philip D. Reichers, and by Philip W. Vetterling and James J. Wagy shed interesting light on these various questions.

Over the long run, the Chinese leadership must rely on technological advance as the principal means of furthering development, and this necessity is accentuated by the major emphasis placed on self-reliance. Leo Orlean's article provides a factual and analytical study of the PRC's policies and potential in science and technology, the keys to technological progress from within. Self-reliance however, does not necessarily preclude the acquisition of technology from abroad, and the PRC's trade in recent years has reflected sizable imports of foreign technology. While such a policy would seem to contradict the principal of self-reliance, it actually is designed to strengthen the PRC's capability to become self-sufficient in the long run. The paper by Usack and Batsavage on trade touches on this problem and at the same time complements the article by Tansky in providing a broader analysis of the PRC's economic relations with the outside world, including Peking's program to project its power abroad through trade and aid.

A particularly important contribution of the JEC volume is the large body of data it makes available to readers. The fact that most of the estimates are approximations subject to considerable margins of error does not detract from their usefulness. For example, one welcomes Ashbrook's estimates of value added in agriculture and industry over the entire period 1957-70 and his dollar estimates of GNP, even though one could challenge the assumption of constant input-output ratios in the former or the basis of valuation in the latter. Such estimates can, of course, be refined and revised in the light of new data or more plausible assumptions. It is for this reason that it is highly desirable that the sources and methods used in arriving at estimates of economic performance be made explicit. While this has been conscientiously done by Ashbrook and Field, Erisman, by contrast, provides little information about how he derives his figures. This is particularly regrettable because a proper evaluation of performance in the agricultural sector is of paramount importance in any assessment of the PRC's growth record. Agricultural performance depends largely on grain and cotton production, and Erisman's estimates of grain and cotton output are but one of several such compilations available.[3] Without adequate information on how he arrived at his estimates, there is no way to judge whether they are more reliable than others.

In an excellent summary essay, Hardt brings the findings of the ten JEC papers to bear on five major questions: (1) How badly was economic development in the PRC set back by the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-69)? (2) How serious were the short- and longer-term effects of the rupture in Sino-Soviet relations on Chinese economic development? (3) In view of China's burgeoning population, can the Chinese economy sustain her major priorities? (4) What burdens

[3] For other estimates, see O. L. Dawson, *Communist China's Agricultural Development and Future Potential*, Washington, DC, US Department of State, 1968, p. 197; and S. Washenko, "Agriculture in Mainland China, 1968," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), March 31, 1969, p. 8.

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do military development and foreign aid—the power-oriented programs—place on economic development? And (5) how successful has Peking been in developing the various economic regions of China?

These are all important and useful questions from the standpoint of assessing the PRC's overall economic record, but they are not the only pertinent questions. Several other significant dimensions of growth have been relatively neglected in the JEC compendium. One example is the matter of structural changes in the economy. To be sure, some aspects of structural changes are discussed by Ashbrook (pp. 40-41), by Field (pp. 66-71), and by Usack and Batsavage (pp. 354-56), but there is no broad examination of changes in China's GNP by sectors that would illuminate such questions as: To what extent has the PRC's industrialization program succeeded in increasing industry's share in GNP? Has transportation grown as fast as the other sectors? How do these sectoral changes compare with the development experience of other countries?

Another area that would seem to have merited greater attention is the opportunity costs of growth. To what extent has Peking sacrificed growth in personal and government consumption in order to sustain a high rate of output growth? What has been the cost of the PRC's military program in terms of resources that could have been used to generate further growth or to increase personal consumption? Regretfully, Ashbrook's breakdown of GNP by end use cannot be used to discuss these questions because, as the author himself points out, this estimate "should be regarded only as an illustrative sketch" (p. 45).

By and large, the studies in the JEC volume are primarily concerned with economic capability, with the result that questions of motivation are somewhat neglected. To be sure, Ashbrook and Jones have dealt with the major turning points in Peking's economic policy and the motivations underlying these decisions at the highest level. But what about the attitudes of those at the lower levels? How successful has Peking been in motivating the plant managers, workers, production team leaders, and peasants to exert their effort in the desired direction?

Finally, there is the related question of income distribution. Have differences in income between urban and rural residents, and between workers of different regions, skills, and industries become greater or smaller? On this question, too, the JEC volume has little to offer. Ashbrook's assessment that the urban-rural gap in 1970 had widened by 100 percent compared to 1957 is interesting (pp. 40-41), but it remains an untested hypothesis because its underlying assumption—that urban employment concides with employment in industry—may not hold for 1970, when a considerable portion of total industrial output may have been produced by small plants in rural districts.

IT IS IN the particular area of incomes that Howe's study serves as a valuable complement to the JEC volume. Specifically, Howe sets out "to provide a statistical analysis of changes in the level and structure of Chinese wages from the 1920's to the early 1970's" and "to elucidate both the mechanisms responsible for these changes and their economic significance" (p. xi).

The study consists of three main parts, of which the first addresses itself to two major questions: First, what changes have there been in the level of real wages since 1949? And second, have there been any significant changes in the structure of wages over that period? Howe finds that the long-term trend of real wages since 1949 has been upward, rising at about 1.9 percent per annum between 1952 and 1972. Most of the increase, however, occurred during 1952-57, and no increase seems to have taken place between 1963 and 1972. As for the wage structure, interindustry differentials at first increased but subsequently fell back to the 1949 level; and the urban-rural differential increased in the 1950's but was stabilized in the 1960's.

The second part of the study deals with wage policies. During 1949-57, the Chinese actively manipulated wages in order both to stimulate work effort and to direct the allocation of manpower. In the latter regard, the leadership found by the end of this period that the existing wage system (patterned after the Soviet model) was inappropriate because it tended to increase wages too rapidly, and since then they have turned to greater reliance on direct controls to allocate labor.

Howe's final section examines the overall incentive structure, of which wages are but a part, albeit a dominant one. As the author notes, the Chinese Communists in the 1950's developed various other incentive devices such as bonus systems and fringe benefits, but these were found too costly and were eclipsed in importance in the 1960's by emulation campaigns. As for the future, the author suggests that the

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Chinese will rely on a flexible mix of internal and external incentives that recognizes the constraints and opportunities posed by the demands of the social system for equity, on the one hand, and the demands of the state for efficiency and growth, on the other.

Howe's book is an outstanding piece of scholarship, probably the most penetrating and comprehensive study of wage patterns and wage policies in republican China to date. It sheds new light on many problems not thoroughly covered in earlier studies such as those of Dwight Perkins, Charles Hoffman, Audrey Donnithorne or Barry Richman, which deal only with the institutional or the managerial aspect of the problem and do not discuss changes beyond the early 1960's.[4]

Like most studies on China, however, this one is not without its shortcomings. To begin with, one could question certain of the author's assumptions and interpretations. For example, Howe presents an interesting scatter diagram showing a close relationship between annual changes in industrial output and in total wages of all workers and staff (in all sectors) for the years 1950-57 (p. 101). This close relationship is then cited as evidence of the market nature of wage determination in the 1950's. However, for market forces to operate in the manner specified by the hypothesis, the supply of labor would have to have been relatively inelastic so that an increase in the demand for labor would increase the wage rate. Whether or not these conditions existed is an empirical question. If Perkins' observation that there was a large pool of unemployed or underemployed unskilled labor in the 1950's is correct,[5] then the assumption of an inelastic supply of labor seems unrealistic. Note also that the correlation allows for no time lag in the relationship between percentage increases in industrial output and percentage increases in the average wage of *all* workers and staff both in industry and in other sectors. This implies that the effect of changes in industrial output on changes in overall wages has been direct and immediate. This is possible, however, only if intersectoral and interregional labor markets are closely linked, information on job opportunities is readily available to workers, transfer costs are relatively low, and noneconomic barriers to labor mobility are easily overcome. Again, it is questionable whether such conditions prevailed in the 1950's.

There are also some minor errors. For example, the data cited in the discussion of changes in real wages (p. 32) refer to *money* wages, not *real* wages. Similarly, on p. 40, the author states that "in the 1970's there seems to have been a renewal of the tendency to lessen differentials between managerial staffs and others (Table 24)." Yet the data in Table 24 (p. 39) refer to the occupational wage structure in a Wusih tire factory in 1963, not 1970. Again, the wage data used in relating changes in output to changes in wages *by regions* in Figure 2 (p. 64) are not from Table 30 as indicated. Table 30 shows interindustry, not interregional wage growth. Such errors are only minor blemishes in a highly competent and thoughtful piece of work.

In terms of Howe's stated objective, one can adjudge his treatment of what happened to the level and structure of wages and why it happened to be excellent, but his discussion of the economic implications leaves something to be desired. In particular, his study would have been of still greater utility had it explored the broader problems of the interaction of wage policies and economic growth, *i.e.*, the effect of the different wage policies and incentive systems on output. For example, the use of internal incentives involves both costs and benefits. By reducing amounts spent for material incentives, such practices do release resources that can be mobilized for investment. But they may affect labor productivity adversely, and if so, the negative effect on output may at some point exceed the positive effect of increases in investment. One would specifically like to know whether this did, in fact, happen in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Howe is not sure on this point (p. 149). Axilrod, whose book will be discussed in detail later, argues that declining incentives were not an important factor in the economic setback after the Great Leap. Erisman, on the other hand, believes that the undermining of peasant incentives was at least one of the major factors in the observed decline in agriculture at that time. In any event, a more complete analysis of China's past experience with changing incentive mixes would certainly be helpful to an assessment of the future.

[4] Dwight H. Perkins, *Market Control and Planning in Communist China*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966; Charles Hoffman, "Work Incentives in Chinese Industry and Agriculture," in JEC, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, pp. 471-98; Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1967; and Barry M. Richman, *Industrial Society in Communist China*, New York, Random House, 1969.

[5] Perkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-40.

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Clearly, there has been an extreme polarization of thinking among China's leaders concerning incentives policy, and the issue is likely to remain a lively one long after the protagonists of the 1950's and 1960's have disappeared from the scene. Future Chinese leaders will have to make their decisions under more or less the same constraints as those of the 1950's-1960's and are thus likely to look back at the policy debates of that period in formulating their own positions. It may be, as Howe says, that we shall never know the inner history of those controversies over wage and incentives policies. But it would still seem worthwhile to examine the issues, the specific viewpoints, and policy decisions more closely than he has done (pp. 58-60). For example, an examination of Mao's writings since 1949 would have shown that Mao had some quite definite ideas about wage policy: for instance, that he favored a wage differential (presumably the overall occupational differential) of four to one or higher, adjustment of wages on the basis of the gross value of a worker's output per workday, and time-rate rather than piecework remuneration.[6] It would also have confirmed Howe's "suspicion" that Mao's positions on wages shifted over time.

Finally, one would have liked Howe to give more attention to another question: the magnitude of the total wage bill. His study concentrates on policies covering the level and structure of wages; however, the size of the wage bill is a highly relevant consideration when it comes to controlling inflation and finding sources of internal financing. It should also be of interest to contrast the relative size of wage payments in total value added in the PRC with comparable data for other developing countries.

COMPARED TO the first two studies, Eric Axilrod's is a much more ambitious undertaking. It aims at discovering "laws" of economic development for China and tracing their actual operation from around 1800 to the present and on to 1984. The book consists of three parts: the first deals with the historical origins of the Chinese revolution; the second, with the process of development since 1949; and the third, with the Cultural Revolution and the struggle between the Maoist and Liuist lines. Within this broad framework, the study covers a lot of ground and provides a number of interesting hypotheses on the development process.

The broad historical sweep of Axilrod's study makes it difficult to comment on all aspects of his analysis within the confines of the present review; hence, the discussion that follows will of necessity focus only on those parts of the book which deal with China's economic development since 1949. Here, three main themes stand out. First, the author argues that over the period 1949-70 grain output—which he considers the most important economic indicator—increased at a much faster rate than all other analysts have believed. Second, regarding total factor productivity, Axilrod again disagrees with the findings of other scholars in claiming that agricultural productivity increased and that this increase has provided the basis for rising industrial employment and for a reduction of the degree of inequality in consumption. Third, he argues that the Maoist-Liuist controversy over development strategy can be described and analyzed in terms of a series of models based on various assumptions about output, employment, and productivity. Using such a model, the author paints an extremely rosy picture of the PRC's economic future: he sees net value-added in agriculture growing at an average rate of 28 percent *per annum* in the period 1970-80. These are interesting and provocative themes and, if substantiated by empirical evidence, would represent a major contribution to our understanding of the Chinese economy. However, the study really fails to fulfill these expectations, for the reasons explained below.

The most distinctive feature of Axilrod's study is his grain output series, which consists of the official estimates for 1949-57 and his independent estimates for 1958-70. Three serious questions can be raised about the plausibility of these data. First, there is reason to believe that the official estimate for 1949, which Axilrod accepts at face value, is too low. The implausibility of this figure can be seen if one compares it with the author's estimate for 1960. The year 1960 is taken as a benchmark because there was fairly strong evidence of an acute grain shortage in that year. Yet Axilrod estimates output per capita in 1960 at 251 kilograms (p. 490), as compared with only 202 kilograms in 1949 (p. 124—based on the official output figure). An internal publication of the People's Liberation Army reported that in late 1960 and early 1961 many in the armed forces were suffering from undernourishment, that people in the countryside were not getting enough to eat, and that Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing admitted difficulties in

[6] Mao Tse-tung, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 252, 367.

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grain supply.[7] Thus it seems reasonable to take the per capita grain output in 1960 as representing a near-starvation level. If at that level of output there was a severe grain shortage to the point of widespread malnutrition, an even more serious food crisis would have had to occur in 1949 if, in fact, per capita grain output was then 20 percent below the 1960 level, as the official 1949 figure would suggest. Yet there was no evidence of a widespread food crisis in that year. Clearly, the official estimate for 1949 has to be too low.[8]

Second, Axilrod derives his estimates for 1958-60 by arbitrarily assuming that the official figures for 1958 and 1959 overestimated actual output by factors of 16 and 26 percent, respectively, and that therefore the absolute decline from 1959 to 1960 amounted to only 30 million tons (pp. 268, 291). Unfortunately, the author provides no convincing justification for these particular assumptions.

Third, and most serious, the author's estimates for 1961-70 appear to be quite inconsistent with official estimates. Starting with an estimated output of 170 million tons of grain in 1960, Axilrod projects an arithmetic progression in output of some 13 to 14 million tons a year, arriving at an estimated output of 306 million tons for 1970. (One would, in passing, remind the author that this does not amount to an "8 percent average annual rate of increase," as stated on page 493). However, according to an official estimate given to Edgar Snow by Chou En-lai, grain output in 1970 was 240 million tons.[9] Axilrod's figure of 306 million tons thus exceeds the official figure by 66 million tons, or 27 percent.

There is still other evidence to support the conclusion that Axilrod's output figures for the 1960's are exaggerated. According to a New China News Agency release of September 24, 1974, the increase in grain output in the period 1965-73 was greater than that in 1950-65.[10] Since reported grain output was 124.7 million tons in 1950 and 257 million tons in 1973, this would mean that, mathematically, output in 1965 could not have exceeded 191 million tons.[11] Yet Axilrod's figure for 1965 is 238 million tons, 25 percent above this upper limit.

So much for the flaws in Axilrod's grain output series. As for his second major theme, arguing an increase in China's agricultural productivity, he runs into a number of logical difficulties, beginning with an apparent misunderstanding of the conventional concept of total factor productivity. According to Axilrod:

This familiar method defines the real agricultural surplus *as the rate of change of output in excess of the rate of change of all inputs, defined as some weighted contribution to output. The excess or surplus, so defined therefore, is the yield or product of the sum of all the inputs. The* ratio of the excess or deficit *as the case may be* to the total inputs *is the total factor productivity, or the result or embodiment of technical change, so defined* (p. 173; emphasis added).

Now, total factor productivity is neither a measure of "real agricultural surplus" nor "a ratio of the excess or deficit . . . to total inputs." It is simply an index of efficiency in combining all the inputs, measured by that portion of the growth of output not accounted for by the growth of inputs.[12]

The author's confusion over total factor productivity has led him to formulate his own concept of productivity, according to which productivity is measured by the ratio of agricultural output not consumed by agricultural labor to agricultural output consumed by agricultural labor (pp. 186-87). Conceptually, this ratio has the defect that it could change quite independently of any change

[7] *Kung-tso T'ung-hsun* (Peking), No. 1, Jan. 1, 1961, p. 7; Feb. 1, 1961, p. 18; No. 11, March 2, 1961, pp. 10, 19. See also Mao's speech before the Working Conference of the Central Committee on Aug. 9, 1962, in Mao Tse-tung, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

[8] With respect to this statement, one could argue that the 1960 estimate was too high, a point which the present author believes to have some validity. Nevertheless, even the lowest Western estimate of Chinese grain output for 1960, *i.e.*, the 150-million-ton figure given in JEC, *Economic Profile* . . ., p. 93, when divided by Axilrod's figure of 677,000,000 population in that year, still gives an output per capita of 222 kilograms, or 10 percent more than the 1949 estimate. For other arguments that official estimates for the earlier years are too low, see Kang Chao, *Agricultural Production in Communist China*, Madison, Wis., University of Wisconsin Press, 1970, pp. 191-213.

[9] *The New York Times*, March 6, 1971, p. 3.

[10] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), Sept. 25, 1974, p. 4.

[11] Mathematically, if output in 1973 minus output in 1965 is greater than output in 1965 minus that in 1950, then the sum of output in 1950 and 1973 should be greater than twice the output in 1965, *i.e.*, 1965 output should be less than 191 million tons—one-half of 382 million tons (125 plus 257). For official data of grain output in 1950 and 1973, see State Statistical Bureau, *Ten Great Years*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960, p. 119, and FBIS, *op. cit.* Sept. 6, 1974, p. A8.

[12] For a summary of various formulations of the concept, see M. Ishaq Nadiri, "Some Approaches to the Theory and Measurement of Total Factor Productivity: A Survey," *Journal of Economic Literature* (Pittsburgh), December 1970, pp. 1137-77.

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in output or in real labor input. To take an extreme hypothetical case, let us suppose that the entire output is cotton and that the agricultural labor force is being fed with imported grain. Under Axilrod's formulation, productivity in this case would approach infinity because the denominator of the ratio, *i.e.*, domestic output consumed by the agricultural labor force, is zero. This, of course, is nonsense.

Moreover, even if we ignore this conceptual defect, there are at least three serious errors in the author's method of estimation. First, consumption of the agricultural labor force (in the author's terminology, "consumption of agricultural labor force input" —line 4 in Table 23, p. 187) is erroneously treated as if it were synonymous with agricultural output consumed by the agricultural labor force, whereas the two are clearly not the same. Agricultural labor force consumption includes not only agricultural products but also products and services provided by nonagricultural sectors, *e.g.*, salt, coal, medical care, housing, etc. Second, this error is compounded when the author derives consumption of the agricultural labor force from an estimate of total food consumption (line 2 in Table 23, p. 187), thereby mistakenly identifying *total consumption* of the agricultural labor force with the *food consumption* of that force. Third, even if we grant that food consumption by the agricultural labor force is an acceptable approximation of agricultural output consumed by agricultural labor, Axilrod's method of estimating the volume of such consumption is faulty. The author arrives at his estimates by multiplying total food consumption in China by the ratio of agricultural labor to nonagricultural population (lines 2 to 4 in Table 23, p. 187). Because this ratio is derived from two *components* of the *total* population, rather than from one component and the totality of population, its application to total food consumption yields a result with no economic meaning.[13]

Projections Based on the Axilrod Model

	1970	1980
Indexes of growth		
Net agricultural output	100	189
Net value added, agriculture	100	1,159
Net value added, industry	100	639
Other data		
Share of industrial net value added in total net value added (percent)	51	36
Share of industrial labor in total labor force (percent)	24	28

The third major theme of Axilrod's study concerns the basic differences between the development strategies of the "two tendencies," *i.e.*, the Maoist and Liuist lines. He has constructed simple models to describe the differing features of the two lines; however, these models have little empirical significance since they do not tell us which development strategy the Communist leadership was actually following at what stage and why. Nor, for that matter do they provide any new insights into the technique of model-building, since they are simple mechanical models whose workings depend entirely on the values assigned to the variables. The dangers inherent in mechanical models of this kind can be illustrated by the peculiar results produced by the model Axilrod uses in making his projections. Based on the author's projections of labor input, productivity, net value added, and net output in agriculture and industry for 1970-84 (p. 507), one can derive the indicators for the period 1970-80 shown in the accompanying table. These indicators reveal two perplexing problems in the author's projection model. First, one notices that "net value added" in agriculture increases by 1,059 percent, while output increases by only 89 percent. This implies a very sharp decline in material inputs, which seems improbable in view of the increasing use of chemical fertilizers, machinery and equipment, and pesticides in agriculture. Second, one notices a much more rapid rate of growth of net value added in agriculture than in industry. It follows from this, as the last two items in the table show, that industry's share in total net value added would fall from 51 percent in 1970 to 36 percent in 1980, while its share in the total labor force would increase by only a few percentage points. In short, China would be

[13] The logical difficulty can be demonstrated by a hypothetical case in which the agricultural labor force is greater than the size of the rest of the population. In this case, the ratio of the former to the latter exceeds unity. Multiplying it by total food consumption, one gets an estimate of food consumption by the agricultural labor force that exceeds food consumption by the entire population.

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less industrialized in 1980 than in 1970—a conclusion which would contradict not only the PRC's own past experience but also the experience of the industrialized nations.[14]

The peculiar results of these projections are due in part to the author's rather unconventional definition of "net value added" as net output minus labor input. Whatever the rationale for this definition, one cannot deduct labor input measured in *millions of workers* from net output measured in *millions of tons*, as the author does (in Table 51, p. 507).

In addition to these major difficulties, there are many other minor shortcomings in the study. For example, the author equates "total deductible nonlabor costs of production" with "total investment" (see line 10 of his Table 34, p. 243), whereas the two are entirely different concepts; in his discussion of income distribution and productivity, he treats assertions as if they were empirical findings; and he fails to define many of the terms used in his study, such as "profit consumption function" (p. 142), "industrial accumulation of agricultural capacity" (p. 143), and "nonstandard of living productive capacity" (p. 525). Even the editing leaves much to be desired, as evidenced by the bibliography. Here, A. Eckstein has been renamed E. Alexander; publishers, places of publication, and publication dates have been listed in some cases and left out in others; and there are gross errors (*e.g., "Hui Pien"* is the Chinese word for "a compendium," not the name of an author, and William Hinton's piece on Fanshan certainly could not have been included in the *Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i).*

In many ways, research on the Chinese economy is similar to archeological work. To push back the frontier of knowledge, there can be no substitute for patient digging and the systematic sorting out and checking of fragmentary information. Then there is the task of putting these pieces together in a logically consistent and empirically relevant framework, and of generating and testing hypotheses about the structural relations among the various pieces and about changes in these relationships over time. The authors of the papers in the JEC volume, as well as Mr. Howe, have obviously gone through such a process with great care, painstaking effort, and technical competence, and I would recommend the former to all serious scholars and intelligent laymen and the latter to professionals. However, Axilrod's book should be avoided by all except those qualified to detect and avoid its many pitfalls.

[14] On the development experience of other nations, see Simon Kuznets, *Economic Growth of Nations*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 143-98.

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Notes & Views
Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20547.

ON GOMULKA

TO THE EDITORS: Mr. Hansjakob Stehle's review of the book, *Gomulka, Politische Biographie* (Gomulka, Political Biography), by Peter Raina, in *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1974, is a piece of irresponsible writing in which the reviewer, instead of taking issue with those statements of Mr. Raina he does not find convincing, argues with statements he does not like. His arguments contain nothing but rhetoric, misinformation, and confusion. It is untrue that Mr. Raina does not discuss "the national element in Gomulka's makeup." On the contrary, he mentions it quite a few times in his book. It is also untrue that when writing about Gomulka's role in the Warsaw uprising of 1944, Mr. Raina does not mention his source and "misrepresents" Gomulka's attitude. In fact, he names the source—the letter of January 12, 1944, which is the same document that Mr. Stehle "discovered" for the readers of his review. Moreover, I do not think that Mr. Raina is "misrepresenting" Gomulka's statements in this letter (although I do not agree that Gomulka can be solely blamed for the fate of the uprising and its participants). Perhaps Mr. Stehle should read the whole letter —comprising six chapters and almost 15 pages—instead of concentrating on the last few paragraphs.

I agree with Mr. Stehle that the readers would like to know about "the profound shock and aftereffect suffered . . . by Gomulka personally, when the Moscow-dominated Comintern dissolved their [the Polish Communists'] party in 1938." But what do we know about it? We can only speculate. If one cares to read Mr. Raina's book carefully, it is quite obvious how Gomulka was shaped by "developments in the Soviet Union and in world communism."

There is no question in my mind but that Mr. Raina has made a very thorough and serious study of Gomulka. My only wish is that he does not take Mr. Stehle's remarks to heart. A person who labels Gomulka a "partisan," who talks about this man's undocumented worries, obsessions, and independent policy toward the FRG, is guilty of either ignorance or irresponsibility in his reporting. I would certainly trade his kind of scholarship for Mr. Raina's "naiveté."

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MR. STEHLE REPLIES: Without referring to Mr. Rozenbaum's personal attack, which by itself reveals his approach to be an emotional one similar to Mr. Raina's, I want to state the following:

First, to mention only "a few times" in a biography of Gomulka the national element in his makeup, as Mr. Raina does, is to neglect a basic thread in the Polish leader's character. In the Polish version of his book (p. 91), Raina insists even more strongly than in the German edition (p. 116) that Gomulka was not at all a "national" Communist, but *"only a stubborn* and *limited* doctrinaire" (emphasis added).

Second, I repeat that Raina fails to state "the *exact* source" for his representation of Gomulka's views in 1944. It is true that he refers (without any date in the German version of his book) to the letter which Gomulka wrote to Moscow. However, he cites it as a document "existing in the archives of the Central Committee" (where it can hardly be verified by Western historians), thus concealing the fact that the full text of the letter is accessible, having been printed and published already in 1958. Anyone who reads the published text and compares it with Raina's abbreviated representation can easily see how misleading Raina's version and interpretation are, particularly with respect to Gomulka's clearly expressed apprehension that Moscow and "its" Poles (the ZPP) could provoke "confusion" in Poland.

CORRECTION

In some copies of the March-April 1975 issue of *Problems of Communism*, the photographs of Soviet party figures V. I. Dolgikh and G. V. Romanov on page 20 were inadvertently switched. Dolgikh is wearing a dark tie and a lapel pin, while Romanov appears in a striped tie and lapel pin.

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(See my essay in William E. Griffith, Ed., *Communism in Europe: Continuity, Change, and the Sino-Soviet Dispute,* Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1964, pp. 93 ff.)

Third, we know a lot about the shock suffered by the Polish Communists (including Gomulka) after the dissolution of their party in 1938. (See, *e.g.,* the documented study by Marian Malinowski in *Z pola Walki,* No. 3, 1968). The way Mr. Raina pictures the political-historical environment of the Stalin era, however, is rather astonishing. To cite one of many examples, he states (on p. 83) that Stalinism began in 1944-45 and "continued without interruption" after Gomulka's first removal from the party leadership in 1949; however, directly after that (p. 89), we are instructed that it "would be wrong to call Stalinist" the period between 1950 and 1955!

Finally, as I acknowledged in my review, Mr. Raina had collected many revealing and even new biographical details about Gomulka. This made his book worth commenting on. But it would have been irresponsible to remain silent about its shortcomings and errors, which are substantial.

MR. HANSJAKOB STEHLE
Rome Correspondent for
Die Zeit (Hamburg)

ABSEES

TO THE EDITORS: Professor John A. Armstrong, reviewer of K. S. Grushevoi's book, *Togda, v sorok pervom* (Then, in '41), in your March-April 1975 issue, states that "no single Western periodical or group of periodicals even purports to review all Soviet books dealing with the politics and society of the Soviet Union" (p. 86) and goes on to complain that such books are but "noticed haphazardly."

Even though active in Soviet studies, he has obviously not heard of ABSEES, the Soviet and East European Abstracts Series edited and published at the University of Glasgow on behalf of NASEES, the National Association for Soviet and East European Studies. Nor have you put him right on this score. Since 1970 we have abstracted Soviet and East European books on the order of 400 per year, in addition to some 3,000 abstracts of articles.

In fact, an abstract of Grushevoi's memoir appeared in our issue of January 1975, *i.e.,* prior to the publication of Professor Armstrong's review. And, incidentally, the 1974 version of the book is a second edition.

It would be kind if you told Mr. Armstrong and your readers that the situation in following Soviet publications is not as gloomy as he implied. Of course, an abstract is not a proper review, and we dare not claim to survey *all* the relevant books.

VLADIMIR V. KUSIN
Editor of ABSEES,
Glasgow, Scotland

PROF. ARMSTRONG REPLIES: Mr. Kusin's reminder of the ABSEES coverage is timely. I have been acquainted with it since its inception and should have mentioned the ABSEES as a valuable aid to Sovietologists.

Nevertheless, as he recognizes, there is a considerable difference between abstracts and reviews. In fact, if the ABSEES coverage of Grushevoi had reached me in time (the January issue was accessioned by our university library on March 26, long after my review was submitted), I should have been tempted to mention it to demonstrate my main point. The abstract appears, in fact, under the heading "Military." Apart from remarks (which I regard as exaggerated) on the book's importance for Brezhnev's biography, the 200 words concentrate on the book's significance for World War II history. As I emphasize in my review, this is precisely the fate which I feared for Grushevoi's memoir, whereas in fact its major significance consists of the light it throws on the regional apparatus and its elite. In reemphasizing this point, I intend no disparagement of the devoted work of bibliographers and abstracters, who are necessarily guided by Soviet titles and classifications; but I continue to find it extremely regrettable that books of this kind are rarely scrutinized by specialists capable of distinguishing their small but crucially important *political* elements.

Mr. Kusin's revelation that the volume I reviewed is in fact a second edition is more to the point. One of the most useful techniques in analyzing Soviet books on political affairs is comparison of successive editions. Since receiving his helpful remarks, I have not had time to make the word-for-word comparison the two editions deserve, but even my hurried examination indicates that the second significantly enhances the role of the police, specifically USSR Interior Minister N. A. Shchelokov. Brezhnev's own image is very slightly altered: in early 1972 he was remembered for encouraging his comrades by a "merry joke"; in 1974 this has become a "cordial word." But perhaps this minor metamorphosis reflects the company he has been keeping.

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